Public Sector Reform and Democracy Assistance:
A Literature Review

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Introduction

This paper seeks to respond to two questions: first, how is public sector reform (PSR) related to democracy assistance? Second, what can democracy assistance providers learn from how evaluations of PSR programs are conducted? The paper argues that PSR is where a democracy's traditional civil and political rights meet the economic, social, and cultural rights expectations often necessary for democracy to be sustainable. The experiences in evaluating PSR are, like most elements of democracy assistance, a work in progress.

Questions of evaluations of course loom large on the democracy assistance as well as PSR agenda. There is increasing pressure in donor countries to show results; results which are difficult to describe in the short term and unfortunately rarely positive in the long run. The literature on this subject is vast and growing. More is known about what does not work in PSR than what does. This paper will be organized in two sections, along the lines of the above questions. In the first section, basic definitions and a background on PSR will be provided. The links between PSR, good governance, democracy assistance, and development will be identified. The second section will describe two recent ways of evaluating PSR and explore whether these evaluations have any lessons for democracy assistance providers.

The methodology used is a literature review of academic work, policy documents, and evaluations produced by different experts and organizations. Canadian experiences are cited where appropriate.

Public Sector Reform and Democracy Assistance

PSR is one of the more complex elements of international development aid. Like its close counterpart *Rule of Law Reform*, PSR ultimately influences all aspects of how a state functions and how the state interacts with its citizens. Understandings of PSR have

evolved in the last 50 years, and only in the last decade have become, with democracy assistance, a crucial element of the good governance agenda. However, while understandings of the role of the state and PSR have changed, it is not yet clear that this has resulted in more or better ways of promoting PSR.

PSR is about strengthening the way the public sector is managed (Schacter 2000, 1). PSR is also known as civil service reform, public administration reform, and more broadly as an aspect of state building. The public sector is composed of those government departments that are responsible for providing the goods and services that all citizens value, which market forces would either under-provide or not provide at all (ibid). The public sector has different departments or agencies that are found at different levels – national, regional, municipal, etc. – of government, with different but sometimes overlapping responsibilities. The strategic direction of the public sector is provided by the citizens' representatives, namely politicians. PSR therefore is about improving how these departments or agencies function internally; how they interact with each other, with their political bosses, and with the citizens they purport to serve; and ultimately how they deliver public goods and services. It is in this latter sense that PSR is a key element of the development agenda, as the public sector plays a crucial role in promoting sustainable development.

Over the course of the second half of the twentieth century, PSR was influenced by the controversies surrounding the appropriate role of the state.[1] In the early days of promoting development assistance, donors took it for granted that government should play a major and direct role in economic development, while paying little attention to the inner workings of the public sector. By the late 1970s and early 1980s, with developed and developing countries alike in financial crisis, questioning of the state led model was reflected in the "structural adjustment programmes" visited upon developing countries. Development assistance became dominated by the theme of reducing the size of the public sector, privatising state owned enterprises, and reducing public expenditures. These reforms were epitomized by the structural adjustment programmes led by the international financial institutions designated as the "Washington Consensus." As Mark

Schacter argues, the pendulum swung from the public sector being regarded as an engine of development to it being seen as an obstacle to it, with little attempt to understand how the public sector really worked (2000, 5).

Since the end of the Cold War, the pendulum has swung back. Economists and development practitioners alike began acknowledging that one of the most important variables affecting development was the quality of the public sector and its interactions with citizens. Thus in the mid and late 1990s, textbooks on "public administration were dusted off" and a renewed focus was given to building the capacity of the public sector (Fukuyama 2004, 23).[2] PSR programmes gained attention, as one can see by the growing number of projects supported from 1994 on by Canadian organizations such as the Institute for Public Administration of Canada (IPAC) and the *École nationale d'administration publique* (ENAP).[3] In part this renewed interest in PSR was driven by the realization that PSR programmes implemented in the previous 20 to 30 years had failed to produce meaningful results. In 1999, an external evaluation of World Bank initiated civil service reform projects found that less than 40 percent of these efforts achieved satisfactory outcomes, most of which were actually unsustainable (Girishankar et al. 1999).[4] Reasons why these PSR initiatives failed will be more fully explored in the next section of this paper. Suffice it to say here that following a review of the literature, more than one observer concludes that the record on PSR supported by other donors before the mid-1990s was just as poor (Schacter 2000, 7; Riddell 2007, 210).

This rediscovery of the importance of PSR was one element in the development of a new concept that linked PSR with the broader development agenda of alleviating poverty and promoting economic development, namely *governance*.[5] It is here that PSR and democracy assistance began relating explicitly to each other, in as much as democracy assistance is also subsumed by the broader democratic governance agenda (Menocal et al. 2007, 3). Precisely how PSR and democracy assistance relate depend on the breadth of activities ascribed to each, as well as the relationship between democracy assistance in its traditional form (i.e. civil and political rights) and broader development goals that arguably aim to deliver on economic, social, and cultural rights.

It is important to note that there is no consensus on what governance constitutes. Governance, as one observer highlights, is a slippery concept that can be used to mean many different things (Riddell 2007, 373). Definitions of governance, similar to the definition of PSR offered earlier, generally include elements of how government interacts with other stakeholders in society; of how governments take decisions; and of how government is accountable to it citizens.[6]

There is also no agreement on how, first, to improve governance in recipient countries; second, on which of its elements are most important; and third, on its relationship to democracy (ibid). For instance, one recent substantive "how-to" guide on monitoring and evaluating governance programmes makes no mention of democracy in the text.[7] Certainly, it is possible for a state to have a capable and professional public sector and not be a democracy.[8] It is in part for this reason that some seasoned development practitioners and democracy assistance experts have warned that conflating support for state building or PSR and support for democracy is at best problematic, noting that each requires different types of interventions (Menocal et al. 2007, 4; Carothers 2002, 16-17). Advocates of this point of view might identify with a narrower, "liberal" approach to democracy assistance, which emphasizes the civil, political, property and minority rights of citizens and amongst other elements, places an increased, explicit emphasis on public sector accountability (Democracy Council 2006, 5).

However, even this limited entry point from democracy assistance to PSR seems to represent the thin end of the wedge. Key observers now recognize that the emphasis by democracy assistance providers on civil and political rights will not be sustainable without equal attention paid to the capacity of the state to respond to the resultant economic, social, and cultural rights expectations of its citizens. Indeed, while there is still debate about the relationship between democracy and development, there is growing evidence that democratic governance spurs more sustainable development outcomes.[9]

It is perhaps not surprising then that amongst donors, language linking development, governance, and democracy assistance is becoming common-place.[10] For instance, the United Kingdom's Department for International Development (DFID) compellingly argues that achieving good governance depends on the inextricable links between state accountability, state capacity, and state responsiveness (United Kingdom 2006; 2007). Similarly, the UNDP has recently argued in appropriately titled "Making Democracy Deliver" that the success of democracy assistance in the long run will depend on "capable and responsive states which can manage the delivery of public goods and services" (Norris 2007, 28). Finally, two oft-cited long term observers of democracy assistance have recently argued separately that simply promoting greater civil and political pluralism without addressing the reforms required within state institutions will not lead to the creation of more sustainable democracies (Carothers 2007; Diamond 2007). In other words, supporting PSR will not be successful without concomitant efforts to support democracy, and vice-versa.

If in theory, as elements of the good governance agenda, PSR and democracy assistance meet in their joint need to promote development and alleviate poverty, in practice they find common ground in the ideas of *participation and capacity building*. PSR providers have traditionally worked on the inside of state bodies, attempting to make these bodies more efficient, more transparent, and better governed. Democracy assistance providers meanwhile have traditionally worked on the outside of state machinery, encouraging and building the capacity of citizens to defend their rights, to express their needs, and to hold their state institutions accountable. Where the two meet is how the citizens are encouraged to participate in a more meaningful way in the decision making of the institutions that govern them, and how state institutions incorporate citizens' views. New forms of social accountability have emerged in international development practices, "in which citizens engage with official accountability processes [using] a combination of strategies that pursue vertical channels (like protests, citizen mobilization and advocacy from the outside) and horizontal mechanisms (like participatory planning and audit exercises, participatory expenditure tracking, public hearings and alternative community-led approaches to service delivery)." (Norris 2007, 76) While this sort of language

permeates donor documentation, it does not yet mean there are clear ways to effectively support such efforts. Vast networks of experts and practitioners attempting to promote similar initiatives in developed democracies also exist, thus this is very much a work in progress in the countries that provide democracy assistance, let alone the countries that receive such assistance.[11]

One result of the focus on participation is that a "silent revolution in public sector governance" has taken place as efforts are now also being devoted to building capacity at the local government level (Shah et al. 2006, 1). As the International Council on Human Rights Policy points out, reforms devolving power to local governments can affect citizens' civil and political rights by enhancing political participation, increasing local autonomy, empowering disadvantaged group; furthermore, by bringing delivery of services closer to those who use them, decentralisation can lead to more effective and efficient government and thereby protect social and economic rights (2005, 5). This is the sort of thinking that may have motivated the Federation of Canadian Municipalities to propose a five year program entitled the *Global Program on Local Government* that would "strengthen local government's legitimate and transparent leadership; improve service delivery that touches people's lives directly; support collaborative relationships with communities; and enhance participatory and transparent governance." (2006, 5)[12] Similarly, the UNDP's approach to PSR identifies open government and decentralization as its twin pillars of a pro-poor, human rights based approach to development (2003, ii). Finally, such initiatives are reinforced by early evidence that successful support for local government and decentralization can increase citizen support for a country's national political system, such as the proponents of decentralization would argue (Hiskey et al. 2003, 85).

However, it is not yet conclusive that PSR or democracy assistance is better served by the new emphasis on local government. Indeed, opening PSR to citizen engagement and linking it to democracy assistance – while necessary – has not simplified matters, as the following section on evaluations of PSR will attempt to demonstrate.

Evaluating Public Sector Reform

Evaluations in PSR, democracy assistance, and democratic governance all face similar challenges. As the Swedish International Development Agency (SIDA) notes in its most recent evaluation plan, "Evaluability is a key problem in the area of support for democratic governance and human rights. Due to the lack of suitable indicators, and the difficulty of attributing effects at the aggregate, national level to small, local projects, previous attempts to evaluate such support has often been [in]adequate." (Sweden 2007, 12) Certainly at the impact level, it is difficult to distinguish PSR projects from democracy assistance projects from democratic governance projects. Clearly this is still a learning process, as evidenced by the project for which this paper is being prepared as well as two other recent calls for proposals by Canada's International Development Research Centre (IDRC) and Norway's Agency for Development Cooperation (NORAD).[13] Thus drawing lessons from past PSR evaluation experiences is not an immediately evident exercise.

Evaluating PSR in and of itself is very challenging. This is due in part to the inherent nature of PSR. Reforming a country's public sector is a long term process; today's industrialized countries took centuries to develop effective public sector institutions (Schacter 2001, 5). Second, successful PSR is more than simply changing the rules and regulations that govern the public sector; PSR is a political process, requiring strong leadership and ultimately a change in the culture of the public sector (Schacter 2000, 7).[14] Third, it is important to keep in my mind that even in data-rich and wealthy industrialized countries, it has been difficult to develop effective output measures to determine how well the public sector works (Fukuyama 2004, 58).

Finally, perhaps one of the biggest challenges in measuring PSR is that it is not always clear how it is being pursued. As noted above, capacity building or capacity development, which is the main activity used to pursue PSR and democracy assistance, remains an ill-defined and unclear concept (Riddell 2007, 207). The Organization for Economic

Cooperation Development (OECD) has found that most donors, including the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), do not have explicit and comprehensive approaches to capacity development (OECD 2007, 61).[15] The World Bank also identifies this problem (cf. Riddell 2007, 209). These challenges are perhaps summed up best by Francis Fukuyama, who reminds us that "there are no globally valid rules for organizational design [therefore] public [sector] reform is necessarily more an art than a science" (2004, 43).[16]

Looking back at the evaluations of PSR programmes implemented in the 1970s and 1980s, these challenges were at the heart of the main reasons for these programmes' failure. First, PSR was approached as a technocratic problem that could be addressed through "textbook" solutions. This ignored the fact that PSR is, as noted above, a political and social phenomenon driven by human behaviour (Schacter 2001, 3). Second, PSR efforts were not owned by local leaders. Donors tended to arrive in developing countries with ready-made "blueprints" for PSR, which undermined the local political leadership necessary to see through these reforms (ibid). Moreover, as many assistance programmes were evaluated based on "services delivered" and not the actual level of capacities developed, donors found themselves taking on the role of the local public sector to ensure service delivery.[17] Third, developing countries share some of the blame, in as much as citizens did not hold their governments sufficiently accountable for PSR, and within the public sector, leaders did not demand PSR because they in turn felt little accountability to their citizens (ibid).

The early signs of a change in PSR results since the late 1990s are not encouraging. A recently published major ten year review of World Bank efforts at supporting capacity building in Africa judges that its efforts are still fragmented and not based on clear needs assessments, and that outcomes are poorly tracked (cf. Riddell 2007, 209). In a sample of capacity building projects, the World Bank further found that less than a quarter had indicators in place to track performance, and for half of all prior projects, no initial assessment had been made of existing capacity needs (ibid).

Similarly, it seems too soon to conclude that pursuing PSR at the local level overcomes these difficulties. PSR at the local level is almost as complex as PSR at the national level; successful outcomes depend on a complex combination of factors, including political will, history, levels of inequity and poverty, the constraints imposed by donors and central governments, and so forth (International 2005, 15).[18] Very few developing countries have actually adopted a comprehensive approach to decentralized decision making and public service delivery, thereby automatically weakening attempts to foster the capacity development of local government (Shah et al. 2004, 6). Some donors now recognize formally that the impact of decentralization in many developing countries has at best been mixed (United Kingdom 2007, 57).

Therefore, can we draw any observations about how we attempt to evaluate PSR, or good governance more broadly, for how we evaluate democracy assistance? PSR evaluations are often part of larger country development programme or frameworks. Donor evaluations of such programmes in the past have been fairly typical: they involve a literature review, a handful of country visits by external experts hired to conduct the evaluation, and interviews with stakeholders in the country in question as well as the donor country.[19] Occasionally there are attempts to socialize findings and recommendations through workshops with donor and recipient country partners at the end of the evaluation. Quantitative indicators (i.e. numbers of individuals trained) are often used. The results of individual evaluations seem equally typical: they are on the whole strangely positive given the World Bank findings cited earlier. Perhaps the most telling finding is that most evaluations are unable to make the link between the short and possibly medium term results of programmes, and the long term reforms that are desired.

If this is the typical way in which evaluations have been conducted, are there any atypical ways that PSR is being evaluated? It is important to observe that some PSR projects may inherently have more monitoring and evaluation built in to the project than typical democracy assistance projects to other actors, such as political parties, the media, and civil society organizations. Since the early 1970s, the World Bank’s Independent Evaluation Group has supported the efforts of governments in developing countries to

strengthen their internal monitoring and evaluation capacities as a component of PSR initiatives. While the overall success of these initiatives are questionable, the wealth of experiences documented by the Bank and described in a recent publication could offer useful guidance to democracy practitioners on how to include more rigorous monitoring and evaluations components in their projects.[20]

Two of the more recent approaches to PSR evaluations draw on lessons of past failures. Both approaches place a premium, although at very different levels, on seeking direct input from citizens in developing countries.

The first approach is very much a grass roots approach, building on the discussion previous section on encouraging citizen participation. This approach is referred to in the literature in different ways, including citizen report cards; community score cards; community based performance monitoring; or citizen centered governance.[21] These different methods attempt to respond to the failure of past reforms by encouraging citizen empowerment through rights based approaches; by fostering bottom up accountability for results; and by supporting the evaluation of government performance by citizens as direct-users of public services (Andrews et al. 2003, 166). Such approaches have been used successfully in many developing countries, including Colombia, India, Bangladesh, Vietnam, Uganda, and the Gambia. These approaches aim to be very participative as they bring together citizens, state bodies, and local civil society organizations to evaluate state performance. The growing use of these initiatives has attracted the interest of large donors, which refer to such initiatives increasingly as “voice and accountability” projects. One project currently being implemented by DFID and SIDA aims is to design a common framework for evaluating the effect of development aid for strengthening voice and accountability (O’Neill 2007, 1).[22] It is not yet clear whether such initiatives can be scaled from the local level up to a national level, or whether they can provide any specific guidance on the causality of specific PSR or governance interventions. Attempts, however, are being piloted in countries as diverse as India, Albania and Malawi precisely to scale up these initiatives and potentially link them to specific assistance programmes (Thindwa et al. 2007, 15).

The second approach also seeks input from citizens, but at a macro level. These approaches, led by researchers linked to the World Bank and USAID, use statistical approaches to quantify changes in governance over time. These approaches seek to overcome the previously identified failure of an all too often lack of baseline date against which to compare PSR and governance programmes. Similarly, the OECD houses the *Metagora Initiative,* which also seeks to enhance assessment methods of human rights, democracy, and good governance programmes, including through the use of public opinion surveys.[23] In the case of the World Bank, it has for the last 10 years supported the *World Governan*ce *Indicators Project*, which draws on data that reflects the views on governance of public sector, private sector and NGO experts, as well as thousands of citizen and public survey respondents worldwide (Kaufman et al. 2007). The researchers have found that even after taking margins of error into account, their data allows for meaningful cross-country comparisons as well as monitoring progress over time (ibid). Similarly, in 2000 USAID began rigorously testing methodologies and theoretic frameworks to measure governance and the process of democratic change in the 125 countries where it works (Sarles 2007). The methodologies used have included, such as their World Bank counterparts, complex growth models drawing on publicly available data from Freedom House and Polity as well as the findings of public opinion surveys as well as expert interviews (ibid). In both cases, USAID and the World Bank have been able to illustrate positive changes over time that result from outside initiatives.

However, these macro level approaches have to date faced three main shortcomings. First, for such data to be scientifically valid, it needs to be measured over many years, which takes a lot of time and money. Second, the time it takes to gather policy relevant data is often at odds with the time-frame in which policy-makers need to produce results. Finally, like the grass roots approaches described earlier, examining change at such a macro level has made it difficult for researchers to link PSR and governance programmes to specific outcomes.

What is unique about the two relatively new approaches to PSR evaluations described is that they incorporate citizen views to a large degree. This breaks the mould of typical donor led evaluations which rely to a large degree on interviews with stakeholders linked to the projects in question. There is a third approach that could contribute to this discussion. The brief reference to rule of law reform at the outset of this paper was not without reason: using human rights language, as this paper has done so far, can add a legal element to this discussion. Most human rights principles – civil and political as well as economic, social, and cultural – are reflected in good governance programmes.[24] States therefore can ostensibly be held legally accountable by their citizens with respect to their national and international human rights obligations. Examples of such cases are making their way through the courts in some developing countries, such as South Africa where economic, social, and cultural rights are mentioned explicitly in the country's constitution. Rights based approaches to evaluating democracy assistance also have been proposed elsewhere (Thede et al. 1996; Lund Madsen 2007). While it is not in the scope of this paper to delve into the discussion about the relationship between human rights and democracy, it is interesting to consider that holding states legally accountable for their human rights obligations could serve as an innovative manner of determining the effectiveness of PSR programmes.

Conclusion:

This paper has attempted to trace a relationship between PSR, democracy assistance, and governance, making what is a difficult and perhaps not always useful distinction between the three. While providing democracy assistance and attempting to improve the functioning of the public sector can be understood as unique elements of a broader good governance agenda, it becomes clear in the literature that none of these approaches actually mean very much independent of each other. In the words of noted Canadian democracy assistance and development observer Bernard Wood, "the schisms" between these different approaches is mystifying; there is a need to get beyond "sectarian" arguments and build a synthesis of approach and strategies to advance economic and social development *and* democracy in tandem (Wood 2007, 44). Following this argument, designing, implementing, monitoring, and evaluating these programmes

therefore will necessitate the increased coordination of donors and recipient countries. The adoption of the Paris Declaration in 2005 by the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) is the latest step by donors to increase efforts in harmonisation, alignment and managing aid for results with a set of monitorable actions and indicators.[25]

With respect to PSR specifically, such coordination presents its own challenges. Some observers have warned that states which can raise a substantial proportion of their revenues from the international community are less accountable to their citizens, thus under less pressure to maintain popular legitimacy, therefore are less likely to have the incentives to cultivate and invest in effective public institutions (Moss et al. 2006, 1). Furthermore, linking large multi-year PSR programmes and/or smaller democracy assistance programmes, to changes in the countries where they are being implemented is no small feat. Two atypical approaches were identified in this paper; atypical in as much as the views of citizens in the countries in question were being considered as a crucial component of evaluations of these programmes.

Even then, there is only so much that such approaches can contribute to better understanding the real impact of PSR and democracy assistance programmes. One final issue that has not been discussed in this paper but that is increasingly recognized as imperative in the success of any PSR or democracy assistance programme is the "political" dimension. Key democracy assistance experts as well as donors now recognize that changes may only be brought about by unexpected political "drivers of change," to cite a recent DFID sponsored study (cf. Riddell 2007, 375). In other words, no matter what the design of a PSR programme or how it is monitored and evaluated, the final changes observed – positive or negative – are inevitably due to factors outside the scope of the programme, factors rooted in context and political decisions. It is for this reason that the two key democracy assistance experts cited earlier in this paper both warn that the democracy assistance agenda, and concomitant efforts on PSR and good governance, faces its greatest challenges in the years ahead (Carothers 2007; Diamond 2007).

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[1] This section draws on works by Schacter (2000; 2001), Fukuyama (2004, chapter 1), Riddell (2007, chapter 3), the UNDP (2003), and Fritz et al. (2006, chapter 2). For how this affected Africa, see Mohiddin (2007). For how this affected Latin America, see Kliksberg (2005) and Lora (2007).

[2] Lists of different types of PSR activities can be found in Perlin (2004, 12), UNDP (2003, 5-12) and Schacter (2000, 6).

[3] See IPAC (2004) available at: http://www.ipac.ca/International_AnnualReport2004. For ENAP, information is only available in French at: http://www.enap.ca/enap/fr/international.aspx?sortcode=1.19.27.33.

[4] The Executive Summary of this publication is available at: http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/EXTPUBLICSECTORANDGOVERNANCE/EXTADMINISTRATIVEANDCIVILSERVICEREFORM/0,,contentMDK:20134442~menuPK:1920056~pagePK:210058~piPK:210062~theSitePK:286367,00.html.

[5] For instance, see one of UNDP's (1997) first publications on the subject: "Governance and Sustainable Human Development," which seems to have influenced most of the literature (cf. Graham et al. 2003, 3).

[6] For a summary of different definitions of governance, see Box 20.1 in Riddell (2007, 374). For a literature review of the good governance agenda, see Fritz et al. (2006).Also see Graham et al. (2003).

[7] See McKay (2007).

[8] See examples in DFID (United Kingdom 2007, 19).

[9] For arguments questioning the link between democracy and development, see sources cited by O'Neill (2007, 11). For evidence in favour of a link between democratic governance and development, see Stiglitz (2002), Siegel et al. (2004), and Siegle (2007).

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[10] Also see CIDA (Canada 2006, 30-33), SIDA (Sweden 2003, 8), USAID (United States 2005, 5), and DANIDA (Denmark 2007, 9). For up to date information on CIDA, see the website of the Office of Democratic Governance: http://www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/CIDAWEB/acdicida.nsf/En/NIC-54102116-JUN.

[11] For instance, in Canada these efforts are well described by the Canadian Community on Deliberative Dialogue, see: http://www.c2d2.ca/default.aspx?DN=32,Documents. In the United States, two interesting networks are the Deliberative Democracies Consortium (http://www.deliberative-democracy.net/) and the Study Circles Resource Centre (http://www.studycircles.org//en/Index.aspx).

[12] There is no indication whether this proposal has received financial support. A description of FCM activities abroad are also published in (2007).

[13] For IDRC, see: http://www.idrc.ca/en/ev-116149-201-1-DO_TOPIC.html; and for NORAD see: http://ted.europa.eu/Exec;jsessionid=13ECF5889A315C8F0E951DF782E4B8FC.instance_1?DataFlow=ShowPage.dfl&Template=TED/N_one_result_detail_curr.htm&docnumber=119814-2007&docId=119814-2007&StatLang=EN.

[14] See Schacter (2000a, 5) for a literature review of these challenges as they pertain to Africa.

[15] For its part, four out of five of CIDA's desired outcomes are related to capacity development (OECD 2007) Over 60% of UNDP projects in 2003 had similar objectives (UNDP 2003, 5).

[16] For a discussion on how these approaches have had limited success in the former Soviet Bloc, see Desai et al. (2007). For a specific discussion on Bulgaria, see Ellison (2007). For a discussion on the difficulties of Australian led PSR capacity building programmes in Vanuatu, see Turner et al. (2005).

[17] See Fukuyama (2004, 88) and Rich (2007).

[18] Two evaluations in particular that refer to such problems are CIDA's *Pakistan Program Evaluation* (Canada 2006a, 11) and the evaluation of the Asian Development Bank's *Project Performance Evaluation Report* on its Indonesia regional programme (ADB 2007).

[19] For instance, see SIDA (Sweden 2007, 21). Also, see Bollen et al. for a critical examination of how USAID evaluations are conducted for democracy and governance programmes (2005) as well as the observations of an independent evaluation of USAID evaluations (document unavailable for download) cited at: http://evalweb.usaid.gov/resources/evalfour.cfm. For an independent over of CIDA's approach to evaluations, see Maneepong et al. (2007).

[20] See McKay (2007). Also see links to different evaluation departments of various governments, found at: www.policy-evaluation.org.

[21] For a more in depth view of these initiatives, see CARE Malawi (2007), Thindwa et al. (2007), and McKay (2007, 14). All of these publications are available on the Affiliated Network for Social Accountability in Africa website, in addition to other useful links: http://www.ansa-africa.net/index.php/toolkits_and_methodologies/.

[22] According to the project's website, the project will "involve a literature review and an analysis of donors' approaches and interventions and the development of an evaluation framework to assess the effectiveness of these on voice and accountability, governance and aid effectiveness. This framework will then be applied to various country case studies contributing to an overview evaluation report." Cited from: http://www.odi.org.uk/PPPG/politics_and_governance/what_we_do/Voice_and_accountability/index.html.

[23] See: http://www.metagora.org/html/index.html.

[24] Graham et al. present how certain good governance principles align with specific civil and political rights found in the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights (2003, 4). The United Nations Commission on Human Rights similarly published a document describing the reinforcing relationship between good governance and human rights, including economic and social rights (2004).

[25] See: http://www.oecd.org/document/18/0,2340,en_2649_3236398_35401554_1_1_1_1,00.html.