

*Halved By Our Horizon? Journeys into the Pluralism of Identity  
Implications for Canadian Foreign Policy*

Synthesis Report  
Walter and Duncan Gordon Foundation

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For *M and D: Nakupenda Sana. Nashukuru.*

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## Foreword

For over a year now, I have been exploring the meaning and relevance of multiculturalism, diversity, and the pluralism of identity for foreign policy. While these issues have always been within the orbit of those (many) perennial fixations that have accompanied me during the ventures of my daily life, the formal time and dedication for investigating these issues did not come until I had the honour of being selected as one of six inaugural Global Youth Fellows of the Walter and Duncan Gordon Foundation.<sup>2</sup> This Fellowship was the creation of the sages at the Foundation and was to be reserved for Canada's "best and brightest" young and emerging leaders "...who demonstrate the potential to enhance Canada's role on the world stage."<sup>3</sup> I hope I have done this vision justice in the pursuits that I have undertaken over the last year, including the thoughts and perspectives shared in the pages that follow.

When I became a Global Youth Fellow in 2006, the implications were profound. The euphoria that came with this public recognition was invigorating, but soon enough I had to put into investigative action some of the deeply woven issues that have occupied my mind for some time. It was in some ways like I could finally pick up my own gunny sack that M.G. Vassanji<sup>4</sup> has written of and go through what was inside. My objective was to connect them into one coherent story; a compass linking history with present and future.

What I expected to stumble upon as I sifted through this gunny sack were the varied and multifaceted dimensions of foreign policy, immigration, citizenship, geopolitics in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century, *etc.* What I didn't expect, to a certain extent, was brushing up against the thicket of real, weighty questions around the definition of a Canadian,<sup>5</sup> constitutionalism, and so forth. As if these forays were not adequate grains for intellectual grazing, I also discovered that the Fellowship year also became a symbol of a personal, dialectical exploration of who I was, who I wanted to be, what I wanted to do, and where - all questions not too far away from those Canada is asking itself around multiculturalism, diversity, identity, and foreign policy.

It is without question that the issues explored in the Fellowship are close to my heart, for they run deep in my personal historical experiences and the transnational ties of my family. Indeed, in hindsight this came to be part and parcel of the enterprise my Fellowship came to represent. Having grown up in Africa (Tanzania, Kenya, and Zambia) to parents of Indian descent; lived and studied abroad (Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States); travelled extensively (Uganda, Malawi, South Africa, Zimbabwe, France, India, and Sweden); being a practicing Muslim; living as a "minority" in every country I have resided or studied in; and an active member of Canadian society (as an Albertan, Québécois, and Ontarian) for 13 of my 28 years of life (the remaining being 15 years overseas, most of which in Africa), issues of identity and diversity have always forced questions of me about my own identity and diversity. Furthermore, these issues have intrigued me because historically they have

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<sup>2</sup> For those who do not know of it, this Foundation is based in Toronto, Canada, and is one of Canada's most (if not *the* most) respected philanthropic organizations. Please see <http://www.gordonfn.org>

<sup>3</sup> Walter and Duncan Gordon Foundation [http://www.gordonfn.org/GC\\_fellowshipguidelines.cfm?cp=95](http://www.gordonfn.org/GC_fellowshipguidelines.cfm?cp=95). [Internet accessed on August 28, 2007]

<sup>4</sup> M.G. Vassanji, The Gunny Sack (Portsmouth: Heinemann Publishers, Inc., 1990)

<sup>5</sup> For some insightful perspectives on the definition of a Canadian, please see: Irvin Studin, ed., What Is A Canadian? Forty-Three Thought-Provoking Responses (Toronto: Douglas Gibson, 2006)

often been a source of conflict in societies *as well as* a source of growth, Canada being no exception.

Diversity has also shaped my drive for global understanding and leadership and has defined the decisions and differences I have made in my life, the lives of others, in my country, and abroad. For in this diversity, I have learned to test assumptions and preconceptions, observed it as an incredible beacon of growth but also as a source of conflict; seen it used as the beginnings of social justice but simultaneously to deliver injustices on the weak and the poor; and learned to appreciate the commonalities that bind and the differences that come to unite, or those that separate. In the positive aspects of diversity, I have found my argument, and in its negative dimensions, my causes to refute. This has served as my personal dialogue with the world, and the communities, societies, countries and institutions I am part of.

Reflecting on the period between September and December 2006, I was afforded several reminders of Canada (in different guises and forms) while overseas: Canada House at Trafalgar Square, with our flag and that of the provinces and territories silhouetted against the UK's National Gallery; Canada Gate at Buckingham Palace; in central London, a plaque commemorating Lord Stanley's 1892 purchase of the original Stanley Cup was revealed, as well as British Columbia House and Québec's *délégation générale*; a maple tree and the busts of Jacques Cartier and Samuel de Champlain at *place du Canada* in Paris, and so on. While in South Africa, one interviewee positively reminded me that our Head of State (who was visiting South Africa at the time) is a black immigrant woman from Haiti, the first independent black republic. He took great measures to describe the importance of the symbolism she represented of Canada and to black South Africans generally.

These revelations came once over when I returned to Canada in January 2007. In Québec City, the subtle (and sometimes not so subtle!) and familiar "Québécois" nationalism was in the air together with the resultant deep emotional undercurrents; the debate on *les « accommodements raisonnables »*<sup>6,7</sup> was ripe in the daily press and even crept into my French immersion classroom discussions (Yes, I am culpable!). My morning runs along the Plains of Abraham/*le parc des Champs-de-Bataille* were my own sewing machine; they provided the opportunity to weave the divergent threads of Canadian history. In Ottawa, under the soft spoken breath of an Inuit interviewee, held tight in conversation, opened up a debate of the ongoing struggles for justice and equality in this country, and the significance of geography for human sustenance.

Juxtaposing all these sentiments, these thoughts, all so entwined with history, circumstance, and time, made for an all-encompassing, emotionally difficult, intellectually stimulating, and undeniably challenging one-year adventure. This was coupled, of course, with the invigorating nitty-gritty of process: debates, presentations, meetings, papers and other activities that have accompanied me along the way.

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<sup>6</sup> The debate is still alive today. Québec *premier-ministre* Jean Charest has tasked two eminent thinkers, M. Gérard Bouchard and M. Charles Taylor, to lead a *Commission de consultation sur les pratiques d'accommodements reliées aux différences culturelles* whose mandate is to look into issues of *les « accommodements raisonnables »*. Please see: <http://www.accommodements.qc.ca/> for further information.

<sup>7</sup> Some authors have written on these issues as well. Please see: Yolande Geadah, *Accommodements Raisonables: Droit à la Différence et Non Différence des Droits* (Montréal: VLB Éditeur, 2007)

It was not only the places that yielded opportunities for growth and syntheses; it was undeniably the people too. Since commencing Fellowship activities in early-September 2006, those whose paths I have been blessed to cross, whose ideas and brains I have picked and challenged, who I have debated (or who have debated me), interviewed, provoked, and had coffee, lunch or dinner with (sometimes several times over), who have worried for my safety and my spirit, and who have been my in-the-closet guardian angels - these people have been so rich in experience, and so wonderfully contradictory. It is difficult to express one's gratitude suitably when one owes so much to all those who have given so generously of their time, effort, love, support, and trust. I have attempted to do this bravely, at the great risk of indirectly leaving some people out, in the "Acknowledgements" section of this Report.

I have used the plural, "journeys," in the title of the Report as a reminder of both the policy and personal journey this year has represented. I would be remiss, however, to neglect the fact that in many instances over this last year almost cataclysmic pangs of despair accompanied this work. One primary fear was not having covered sufficient ground, due to time or otherwise. I have realized, however, that inevitably this could be where you will find yourself arriving to in this Report, at least in some instances; that is, coming face to face with gaps, omissions, and generalities. In my view, this is not surprising for a work of one year that is investigating an area of policy that has so far been little explored and had to be done in conjunction with a multitude of other responsibilities such as formal employment. Therefore, as noted in my original Fellowship *Statement of Intent*, this Report represents a *preliminary investigation* into multiculturalism, diversity, the pluralism of identity, and foreign policy. Any errors and/or omissions in this Report are my own, and I alone assume full responsibility.

Nonetheless, if after reading this Report, you are left with a few seeds of deliberation that have convinced you that these are issues worth exploring in further detail (or at least have prompted you to ask yourself meaningful questions), then I would consider my year's work a success. This is just the very beginning of an area that is rich, exciting, and replete with opportunities for deeper survey. I am open and eager to work with those who are reading this and who would like to explore these issues in further detail with me and to continue this journey of expanding our horizons.

Finally, I leave you with a few words from the song "Arlington" by The Wailin' Jennys. This band of three talented women hails from the friendly province of Manitoba. When the words and music of this tune met my ears, they spoke something of much significance to me:

*"Where is your home restless wind?  
Is it there? Is it here?"*

*Do you search for a place to belong?  
Search in vain? Search in fear?"*

*Or is your spirit everywhere?  
Is your voice every tree?  
Your soul of the air..."*

*If there's no home, is there no death?  
Is there no death?"*<sup>8</sup>

The Jennys' song, as art generally does, articulates the issues and questions in the pages that follow in its own unique way: the words strike directly at home, of places, of things unknown, of belonging, of mobility, of fate, of choice, of destiny. My life has indeed taught me to appreciate the wonderful and trying manifestations of our modern humanity, but I believe it has also lent me a (sometimes provocative) hand in trying to further understand these manifestations, to continue to "push the envelope" so to speak. I hope that this Report in its own little way serves as a temptation for you to do the same.

Ottawa, Canada  
September 26, 2007

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<sup>8</sup> "Arlington", The Wailin' Jennys <http://www.thewailinjennys.com/lyrics.aspx#arlington>. [Internet accessed August 28, 2007]

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*Halved By Our Horizon? Journeys into the Pluralism of Identity  
Implications for Canadian Foreign Policy*

**Executive Summary**

**I. Issue of Focus**

My Global Youth Fellowship (GYF) is a *preliminary examination* into the nature and relationship of multiculturalism/diversity for Canadian foreign policy. Furthermore, my Fellowship examined whether another model for defining some aspects of Canadian foreign policy is needed, one that gives more attention to the pluralism of identity (*i.e.* multiple identities and affiliations) as opposed to multiculturalism/diversity alone; that is, are we halving our horizons (*i.e.* limiting ourselves) by rationalizing foreign policy through the lens of multiculturalism/diversity or is it time to move beyond this towards a more pluralistic framework which incorporates the relevance of the many ways people see and define themselves (*e.g.* ethnicity, religion, race, culture, class, gender, profession, politics, *etc.*)?

*Mentor:* Dr. Jennifer Welsh, Professor of International Relations, Oxford University.

**II. Methodology**

The formal period of this investigation took place from September 2006–April 2007. Two major highlights of the GYF research included: **(a)** *Interviews* with experts/leaders on multiculturalism, diversity, the pluralism of identity, and foreign policy. These experts/leaders came from politics, government, civil society, academia, journalism *etc.*; **(b)** *Comparative dimension:* interviews were undertaken with experts/leaders in Canada, the United Kingdom (U.K.) and South Africa.

Investigation into the GYF issue of focus assumed four important stages: **(a)** Background Research and Development of Interview Instruments; **(b)** Interviews with experts/leaders in Canada, the U.K., and South Africa, and Site Visits to Relevant Institutions (*e.g.* the apartheid museum); **(c)** Formal Feedback Opportunities (*e.g.* presentations) and Knowledge Development (*e.g.* attendance at conferences); and, **(d)** Synthesis of Findings.

**III. Results**

*Multiculturalism and Diversity:* Interviewees were encouraged to share their views on multiculturalism and diversity in order to understand the domestic context of these issues in their countries. Furthermore, this was done to infer whether the issues raised in the domestic realm could have possible implications for foreign policy beyond the ones articulated by respondents when they were asked questions directly linking multiculturalism, diversity, and foreign policy (see below).

Generally, interviewees spoke of issues around the following *interrelated* themes: contending with **Historical “Solitudes;” National Identity** in the face of immigration and globalization; practical challenges of **“Integration” & Economics;** the sharing of **Power and the “Business of Possession;”** representation in **Institutions;** and, misconceptions generated or sustained by **Politicians, the Media and the Popular press.**

*Multiculturalism, Diversity, and Foreign Policy:* On the whole, several respondents across all three countries agreed that multiculturalism and/or diversity are important for foreign policy. Many believed that this was true because they saw foreign policy as a means of **defining and expressing what and who their country represented abroad** (that is, what their country “stood for”) as well as what their country’s **national interests and values** are. At the same time, however, some interviewees were not always sure if there was a direct relationship between multiculturalism and/or diversity and foreign policy but many believed some sort of relationship between these variables existed. Furthermore, many also felt that their countries were already taking advantage of the multicultural and/or diverse make-up of their countries for foreign policy purposes, at least to a certain degree.

The following are some of the major *interrelated* issues that arose during the interviews: **Living by Example and Looking Inside**, or how a state behaves towards its own multicultural and/or diverse population is the basis of its foreign policy credibility inside and outside its borders; **Role of Diasporas and Transnationalism** in the development, shaping, or execution of foreign policy; instigating and/or exacerbating **Conflicts and Ignorance** of foreign policy actions; unconscious or subliminal **Racism in Foreign Policy**; the “closed door” nature of **Foreign Policy and Dialogue**.

*Pluralism of Identity and Foreign Policy:* As with multiculturalism and diversity issues, the pluralism of identity was seen as **generally relevant** for foreign policy. Furthermore, many felt that **a relationship existed between the pluralism of identity and foreign policy**. However, respondents were not always sure if this was a direct relationship. Some informants articulated that they had **not previously given much thought to the role or relevancy of the pluralism of identity in foreign policy but that this presented a novel and/or interesting angle**. Finally, several respondents also inferred that their countries, to a certain extent, were **already taking advantage of the pluralism of identity for foreign policy purposes**.

The following are some of the major *interrelated* issues that arose during the interviews: there is a **Limited Understanding** of the implications of the pluralism of identity; the pluralism of identity encourages **Multiplicity as Belonging**; raises issues of **Complexity and Unity in Plurality**; advances a **“Hospitality of Difference”** within Canada and outside of Canada; and, identifies and respects **Internal Pluralisms** in communities.

#### IV. Analysis

Like many other “Western” democracies, Canada is undergoing a period of “reappraisal.” This is because Canada is endeavouring to adapt to a world that is globalizing *outside* of its borders. Given the nature of globalization as well as the realities of economic demography, Canada is also simultaneously attempting to adapt *inside* its borders. One of the manifestations of the latter is the increasing multicultural, diverse, and plural make-up of Canada’s population. What has made Canada distinctive *vis-à-vis* its contemporaries, however, is the broad support multiculturalism, diversity, and pluralism has enjoyed in Canada, and (to a certain degree) in Canadian foreign policy. Yet, with this distinctiveness comes *responsibility*.

Multiculturalism, diversity, and the pluralism of identity are not antithetical concepts; they are interrelated and mutually reinforcing. If, generally speaking, foreign policy is the actions,

roles, and expression of a country beyond its borders, then it is appropriate that multiculturalism, diversity, and the pluralism of identity figure prominently. To a certain degree, this is true of Canada. However, in the reappraisal Canada is presently going through (and will be going through in the coming decades), there exist risks and opportunities: *Risks*, that Canada will become complacent and worse yet turn a *volte face* to the very possessions from which it garners its international credibility; and, *Opportunities* to continue to build on the distinctiveness of its situation with regards to multiculturalism and diversity, with the value-add of the pluralism of identity.

In order that multiculturalism, diversity, and pluralism figure in Canada's foreign policy, Canada must continue to "cultivate its garden" more seriously with regards to outstanding issues related to its historical and immigrant diversity; open doors, enhance knowledge, and develop appropriate institutional responses along the dimensions of multiculturalism and diversity; and, finally, embrace pluralism and what it can possibly offer for domestic and foreign policy.

## **V. Moving Forward**

Some general recommendations for moving forward include:

*Knowledge Development and Deeper Institutionalization* of multiculturalism, diversity, and pluralism of identity in government departments and civil society organizations involved in foreign policy issues.

*Engagement (Civic and Global)*: Investing in the power of individuals and communities to make connections with each other in Canada and the world outside of Canada with the objectives of dialogue to finding the commonalities that bind.

*Education*: Investments to continue to nurture educated youth and adults who are nationally and globally informed and conscious.

*Recruitment and Retention of Aboriginal peoples, Immigrants and Visible Minorities in Public Institutions.*

*Enhancement of Investments in Aboriginal Political, Economic, and Social Development Programs* as well as *Enhancement of Investments in Immigrant "Integration" Programs*: This includes programs combating racism, sexism, homophobia, and so forth.

*Development and Dissemination of General Guidelines on the Role and Participation of the Federal, Provincial, and Territorial Governments in Foreign Policy* in order to make clear to Canadians what to expect from these levels of government in matters of foreign policy.

*Let Us Talk Together* ((by Everett Standa (Kenya))<sup>9</sup>)

Come  
Let us talk together  
Forget your theories and factories,  
Let us talk about ourselves;  
You and me.

Have you wondered why  
We fear each other as we do?  
Why you worry about my colour  
And not my inside?  
Why, like a bull in the arena,  
You charge at me without thinking,

Have you wondered why  
Even after all your education  
In psychology and sociology  
In logic and biology  
In mathematics and the bible  
You still can't think  
Without reacting to my skin colour?

Do not tell me about history  
For you and me were not born when it happened  
Have you wondered why  
You call me a criminal in Southern Africa  
And unqualified elsewhere in the world?

And now I hear  
You want to build a bridge  
On which you can cross your culture  
Into my culture  
In what you call  
Cross-culture communication.

My friend,  
Is culture the cause of our fear  
Of ourselves?  
Have you wondered why?

I still bleed and hurt  
From the wounds of our hatred  
Of each other,  
Here I stand facing you.

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<sup>9</sup> From: A.D. Amateshe, ed., *An Anthology of East African Poetry* (Essex: Longman Group Ltd., 1988)

“*‘Il faut cultiver notre jardin’*, Voltaire said. This is not a recipe for quietism and complacent withdrawal. It means Canada matters to the world, less for its specific policies - though they matter - than for our example. If every democracy in the world is wondering how to create a new contract that will turn multicultural ghettos into communities of citizens, if that is the central political task of our age, then what matters most is that we do this right. This is what we must show the world. We must survive: we are a blessed country - rich, prosperous, and free. If we cannot make a multicultural community composed of two national language groups, three founding peoples, and constituent communities from every nation in the world, no one can. No one will.”<sup>10</sup>

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<sup>10</sup> “Canada in the World: The Challenges Ahead” Beatty Lecture, McGill University. Michael Ignatieff <http://michaellignatieffmp.ca/?p=69>. [Internet accessed on August 30, 2007].

*Halved By Our Horizon? Journeys into the Pluralism of Identity  
Implications for Canadian Foreign Policy*

**I. Introduction**

***A. Setting the Stage***

If diversity issues were once the primary prerogative of social workers and immigration experts, this is certainly not the case any more. The world has changed profoundly over the last sixty years or so since the end of the Second World War, with the end of the Cold War, and emphatically so since the terrorist acts of September 11, 2001. Contending with diversity issues, human or otherwise, and laced as they are in history, economics, politics, international relations, geography, time, and circumstance, have left markers in the minds of those whose memories of hope and tranquility were quickly awakened once again to their fragility, such as when the world stood and watched as close to 1 million people were executed in Rwanda. The “New World Order” of global reconciliation and freedom post-1989 soon gave way to a new breed of concern, simply put, of how people could continue to live together and what international institutions, governments, and concerned citizens would be able to do about this. *What would this mean:*

- With the seeming resurgence of identity politics and secessionism, with new actors, new security issues, and new demands and expectations?<sup>11</sup>
- When enduring pressures of globalized market economics, immigration, environmental catastrophe, and intractable global poverty remain?
- When our world is still plagued by major humanitarian emergencies, gross abuses of human rights, war crimes, and acts of terrorism<sup>12</sup> in the name of difference?
- In a post-September 11, 2001 world where specific communities are under the microscope, and where the adulteration of human rights in the name of security has brought about whether universal human rights were ever absolute at all?

It is in these currents and more that many have turned to Canada for some answers. As a democratic<sup>13</sup> and prosperous country composed of multiple peoples with diverse backgrounds and histories, and that has been capable of creating a society that has been able to function relatively competently, Canada continues to inspire the hope that unity can be found in diversity. Canada’s rankings in the United Nations Development Program’s (UNDP) *Human Development Report* perhaps bear witness furthermore that unity and diversity can be accompanied with human development and material progress;<sup>14</sup> Canada’s cities

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<sup>11</sup> International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, *The Responsibility to Protect* (Ottawa: The International Development Research Centre, 2001).

<sup>12</sup> The Human Security Centre, *The Human Security Report 2005: War and Peace in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005). Also available at <http://www.humansecurityreport.info/index.php?option=content&task=view&id=28&Itemid=63>

<sup>13</sup> R. MacGregor Dawson and W.F. Dawson, *Democratic Government in Canada*, 5<sup>th</sup> Ed. (revised by Norman Ward) (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1989)

<sup>14</sup> For an overview of Canada’s rankings *vis-à-vis* other countries, please see: <http://hdr.undp.org/>

generally hail among the world's best.<sup>15</sup> Canada is even “cool,” partly as a result of its tolerance of diversity.<sup>16</sup>

It is therefore instructive that in a speech on the *challenges of foreign policy* for Canada, Michael Ignatieff emphasizes the importance of contending with diversity issues as a central challenge.

Yet, while Canada has been spared protracted civil wars and bloodshed, it must be remembered that Canada has *not* had the luxury of being free from internal strife or divisions as a result of its diversity, many of which continue to this day. Examples abound in our history and to our present: *viz.*, injustices against Aboriginal peoples, such as through the Indian Residential School system;<sup>17</sup> *le Grand Dérangement* of *les Acadiens* in 1754-1755;<sup>18</sup> internment of Canadians of Japanese origin;<sup>19</sup> head-tax and exclusionary measures on Canadians of Chinese origin;<sup>20</sup> referenda on Québec secession (in 1980 and 1995); continued disillusionment by Québécois and Aboriginal peoples on their place in Canada;<sup>21</sup> and systemic discrimination against black Canadians and feelings of “being out of place” by visible minorities,<sup>22</sup> to name a few.

It is certain that diversity issues, historical or otherwise, will in the coming decades continue to play a significant role as Canada will bear witness to growing immigrant diversity, coupled with a growing Aboriginal population. While immigration has always defined Canada throughout its history, between 2020 and 2046 immigration will account for all of Canada's population growth.<sup>23</sup> By Canada's 150<sup>th</sup> birthday in 2017, roughly one in five (or between 19-23%) Canadians will be a member of a visible minority, and over half the population of Toronto (and close to half the population of Vancouver) will belong to a visible minority group.<sup>24</sup> By 2017, roughly 4.1% of the Canadian population will be Aboriginal (up from 3.4% in 2001) and from 2001-2017, there will be an increase of 41.9% in young adult Aboriginal peoples into the Canadian labour market.<sup>25</sup>

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<sup>15</sup> *The Economist* [http://www.economist.com/markets/rankings/displaystory.cfm?story\\_id=8908454&CFID=16415879&CFTOKEN=94552766](http://www.economist.com/markets/rankings/displaystory.cfm?story_id=8908454&CFID=16415879&CFTOKEN=94552766) [Internet accessed on September 1, 2007]

<sup>16</sup> *The Economist* <http://www.economist.com/printedition/index.cfm?d=20030927> [Internet accessed September 1, 2007].

<sup>17</sup> Please see <http://www.irsr-rqpi.gc.ca/english/history.html>

<sup>18</sup> Clive Doucet, *Notes from Exile: On Being Acadian* (Toronto: McLelland & Stewart, 1999)

<sup>19</sup> *Canadian Race Relations Foundation* <http://www.crr.ca/Load.do?section=26&subSection=37&id=241&type=2>. [Internet accessed September 1, 2007]

<sup>20</sup> *Chinese Canadian National Council* <http://www.ccnc.ca/redress/history.html>. [Internet accessed September 1, 2007]

<sup>21</sup> Keith Banting, “Ties that Bind? Social Cohesion and Diversity in Canada” in *Belonging, Diversity, Recognition, and Shared Citizenship in Canada*, Keith Banting, T.J. Courchesne, and F.L. Seidle, eds. (Montréal: Institute for Research of Public Policy, 2007)

<sup>22</sup> Statistics Canada, *Ethnic and Diversity Survey: Portrait of a Multicultural Society* (Ottawa: Ministry of Industry, 2003)

<sup>23</sup> *Statistics Canada* <http://www.statcan.ca/Daily/English/051215/d051215b.htm>. [Internet accessed September 1, 2007]

<sup>24</sup> Statistics Canada, *Population Projections of Visible Minority Groups: Canada, Provinces, and Regions 2001-2017* (Ottawa: Ministry of Industry, 2005): iv, 12.

<sup>25</sup> Statistics Canada, *Population Projections of the Aboriginal Populations: Canada, Provinces, Territories 2001-2017* (Ottawa: Ministry of Industry, 2005): 8-9.

## ***B. Multiculturalism, Diversity, the Pluralism of Identity, and Foreign Policy***

Canada's multiculturalism and diversity is not superficial; it is deep in our historical consciousness, geography, demographic realities, public policies, and constitutional make-up.<sup>26</sup> Canada's geographical diversity ranges from the temperate to the Arctic, from rugged mountains to flat plains, from coastal shores to Great Lakes. Aboriginal peoples continue to represent a diverse spectrum of cultures, peoples, and practices, which thrived much before the arrival of Europeans. The very name "Canada," a St. Lawrence Iroquoian word, means "village" or "settlement,"<sup>27</sup> and itself conjures the image of people arriving to Canada's shores. The *Québec Act* of 1774 recognized the legitimacy of the French language, Roman Catholic faith, and French civil law in Québec.<sup>28</sup> Immigrants settled the West and helped to build the trans-Canada railway. In 1971, the Trudeau government made Canada the first country in the world to enact an official Multiculturalism Policy, which was reaffirmed by former Prime Minister Mulroney's *Multiculturalism Act* of 1988.<sup>29</sup> Various constitutional debates and/or policy choices have also centred on accommodating diversity in the federation, such as during the founding of Canada itself, the Charlottetown and Meech Lake proposals, and ongoing debates on Aboriginal self-government.

This experience with multiculturalism and diversity has arguably served as a source of Canadians' pride in Canada itself, and Canada's role(s) *vis-à-vis* the world. In recent years, the majority of Canadians continue not only to support multiculturalism but also see multiculturalism as a fundamental symbol of Canada, with 82% agreeing that multiculturalism is a source of pride for Canadians and 69% contending that multiculturalism helps national identity and citizenship and the identification of common values.<sup>30,31</sup>

Many scholars have noted that the Canadian experience provides a sound platform for our foreign policy. For example, Jennifer Welsh has argued that Canada can be a "Model Citizen" whose experience could/should be shared with the world.<sup>32</sup> In fact, the extension of the domestic assets of multiculturalism and diversity towards informing foreign policy has also provided a rationalization of Canadian foreign policy roles. For instance, the International Policy Statement<sup>33</sup> does this by justifying promoting democracy abroad; sharing expertise in federalism; advising on the rule of law and our "distinctive" human rights

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<sup>26</sup> Section 27 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, for example, stipulates that the basic rights enshrined in the Charter "be interpreted in a manner consistent with the preservation and enhancement of the multicultural heritage of Canadians." Please see: "The Constitution Act, 1982" Department of Justice [http://laws.justice.gc.ca/en/const/annex\\_e.html#I](http://laws.justice.gc.ca/en/const/annex_e.html#I). [Internet accessed April 26, 2006]

<sup>27</sup> "Canada," Wikipedia <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Canada>. [Internet accessed September 2, 2007]

<sup>28</sup> "History of Québec" Wikipedia [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History\\_of\\_Quebec#Quebec Act .281774.E2.80.931791.29](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_Quebec#Quebec_Act_.281774.E2.80.931791.29) [Internet accessed September 2, 2007]

<sup>29</sup> Department of Canadian Heritage [http://www.pch.gc.ca/progs/multi/reports/ann2005-2006/4\\_e.cfm](http://www.pch.gc.ca/progs/multi/reports/ann2005-2006/4_e.cfm). [Internet accessed September 2, 2007].

<sup>30</sup> "Focus Canada," Environics Research Group. [Internet accessed January 2002]

<sup>31</sup> Legér Marketing, Le multiculturalisme au Canada (Montréal: Legér Marketing, 2006)

<sup>32</sup> "Where Do I Belong? Exploring Citizenship in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century" Hart House Lecture, University of Toronto. Jennifer Welsh [http://individual.utoronto.ca/dtsang/hhlecture/Resources/Welsh\\_2004.pdf](http://individual.utoronto.ca/dtsang/hhlecture/Resources/Welsh_2004.pdf). [Internet accessed on April 26, 2007].

<sup>33</sup> "A Role of Pride and Influence in the World: Canada's International Policy Statement" Government of Canada. <http://www.dfait-macci.gc.ca/cip-pic/ips/overview-en.asp> [Internet accessed March-April, 2006]

tradition;<sup>34</sup> and in Canada's role in peacebuilding. In addition, the new Conservative Government has outlined accommodating diversity as an important Canadian value,<sup>35</sup> and promoting "...Canada's core values of freedom, democracy, the rule of law and human rights around the world."<sup>36</sup> Other manifestations of diversity on the international stage include consultations with Diaspora groups on post-conflict reconstruction and security issues (e.g. Haitian-Canadians and Muslims) and Canadian representation on/at international institutions (e.g. the Commonwealth, *la Francophonie*, Québec at UNESCO, Aboriginal peoples at the Summit of the Americas, etc.)

Using multiculturalism/diversity for foreign policy purposes in a globalizing world, however, raises an interesting issue. As globalization brings people of different backgrounds closer, one can argue that an outcome (in some quarters) has actually been a backlash; that is, the need for groups to *assert/reassert* their identities. Furthermore, in a post-September 11<sup>th</sup> world, significant attention has been paid to specific identities (e.g. "Islamic" identity) as if these identity variables were the only definitive representation of people, when people have multiple identities and affiliations (that is, a *pluralism of identity*). Indeed, as Amartya Sen has argued, conflicts and violence are in fact often sustained by the illusory concept of a "unique" and a choiceless identity bypassing the important ways people see themselves.<sup>37</sup>

### ***C. Issue of Focus and Purpose of Report***

Given the above, the **issue of focus** for my Global Youth Fellowship (GYF) is a *preliminary examination* into the nature and relationship of multiculturalism/diversity for Canadian foreign policy. Furthermore, my Fellowship examines whether another model for defining some aspects of Canadian foreign policy is needed, one that gives more attention to the pluralism of identity (*i.e.* multiple identities and affiliations) as opposed to multiculturalism/diversity alone; that is, are we halving our horizons (*i.e.* limiting ourselves) by rationalizing foreign policy through the lens of multiculturalism/diversity or is it time to move beyond this towards a more pluralistic framework which incorporates the relevance of the many ways people see and define themselves (e.g. ethnicity, religion, race, culture, class, gender, profession, politics, etc.)?

This Synthesis Report will highlight the research methodology employed as well as the major results of the investigation into the issue of focus for my Fellowship. After providing an analysis of the results, the Report will also suggest some possible ways to move forward on issues of multiculturalism, diversity, and the pluralism of identity for Canadian foreign policy.

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<sup>34</sup> Michael Ignatieff, *The Rights Revolution* (Toronto: Anansi Press, 2000)

<sup>35</sup> One result of this, for instance, is the provision of a seat at UNESCO to the province of Québec because of its "special cultural responsibilities." Please see "Speech from the Throne 2006: Turning a New Leaf" Government of Canada [http://www.sft-ddt.gc.ca/sft-ddt\\_e.pdf](http://www.sft-ddt.gc.ca/sft-ddt_e.pdf) [Internet accessed March-April 2006]

<sup>36</sup> "Speech from the Throne 2006: Turning a New Leaf" Government of Canada [http://www.sft-ddt.gc.ca/sft-ddt\\_e.pdf](http://www.sft-ddt.gc.ca/sft-ddt_e.pdf) [Internet accessed March-April 2006]

<sup>37</sup> This illusion in turn has resulted in theories predicting a "clash of civilizations" or the like, giving much justification to the domestic and foreign policy actions of the world's states. Please see: Amartya Sen, *Identity and Violence: The Illusion of Destiny* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, Inc., 2006)

## II. Research Methodology

### ***A. Definitions***

The working definitions employed during this study were intentionally set out to be general. This was because these definitions served as a platform for the interviewees to enter into a discussion of the issues of multiculturalism, diversity, the pluralism of identity, and foreign policy. Generally, it was assumed that the realms of the domestic (*i.e.* those things contained within a country's borders) and international (*i.e.* those things outside a country's borders) were related.

**“Multiculturalism”**: Refers to non-homogeneity in societies a result of active immigration from non-traditional sources; For example, Canada is a “multicultural” society because of active immigration from non-traditional sources of immigrants, especially since the 1960's.

**“Diversity”**: Describes societies that are non-homogenous as a result of active immigration policies but also more generally is a term that recognizes other key pillars that make that society non-homogenous (*e.g.* in Canada, our French/Québec, British/English, and First Nations/Inuit/Métis history).

**“Identity”**: Describes the facets of an individual and/or collectivity's being that s/he (or the collectivity) has reason to value, whether this is race, ethnicity, religion, culture, language, gender, *etc.*

**“Pluralism of Identity”** (often shortened to **“pluralism”**): Refers to the many factors that make up an individual's and/or collectivity's identity. This includes race, ethnicity, religion, *etc.* but goes beyond these variables as well (*e.g.* pluralism = race, ethnicity, religion + gender, political inclination, disability, profession, *etc.*)

**“Foreign policy”**: refers to the actions, roles and expression of a country beyond its borders.

### ***B. Comparative Perspective***

To assess the similarities/differences of multiculturalism, diversity, and the pluralism of identity in Canada for foreign policy, these issues were examined from a comparative perspective. Countries for comparison included the **United Kingdom (UK)** and **South Africa**.<sup>38</sup>

The UK and South Africa were selected for several reasons. Generally, both the UK and South Africa share the similarity of contending with the challenges of multiculturalism and diversity. The **United Kingdom** was selected in particular as an important comparison because various policy choices (*e.g.* the “War on Terror”) have had direct impacts on the relevance of multiculturalism in the country. For instance, the UK is believed to be one of

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<sup>38</sup> While a brief “reconnaissance” trip was made to Paris, France, the focus of comparison with Canada was to remain with the UK and South Africa, given limitations of time and resources.

the prime training grounds for terrorist recruits; has experienced waves of “Islamic extremism”; and has instituted a different schooling system for Hindus and Muslims. Furthermore, the UK is one of the founding two European cultures of Canada and is also an example of a multicultural and multinational state (Scottish, Welsh, English, *etc.*) whose unity to some degree has been threatened as a result of its diversity.<sup>39</sup>

Given historical racial tensions (*e.g.* apartheid), a diverse socio-cultural make-up, the borrowing of Canadian experience to inform its post-apartheid constitutional development, and its role as a regional power, **South Africa** was also selected as an important point of comparison. Furthermore, South Africa has made efforts to accommodate diversity (*e.g.* policies associated with “Black Empowerment”) in ways that have often been viewed as controversial.

Finally, both the UK and South Africa were also selected because of the familiarity of these two countries to the author from previous life experiences, which was important given limitations of time and resources.

### ***C. Research Activities***

The formal research period of this investigation took place during September 2006-April 2007. The major elements of this research period included: (i) Background Research and Development of Interview Instruments; (ii) Interviews with Leading Policymakers in the UK, South Africa, and Canada and Site Visits; (iii) Formal Feedback Opportunities and Knowledge Development; and, (iv) Synthesis of Findings. Again, it should be recognized that this research is a *preliminary examination* intended to probe and outline major issues at a general level.

#### **(i) Background Research (September-October 2006)**

Background Research took four primary forms:

(a) A *review of the literature* on multiculturalism, diversity, the pluralism of identity, and foreign policy. This was done primarily at the Ottawa Public Library, Library and Archives Canada, the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) Departmental Library; Department of Canadian Heritage Library; and, through Internet-based searches and research.

(b) *Background/informal meetings and discussions with experts* in different fields (academia, civil society, government, journalism, *etc.*) on the aforementioned topics, which included travel to their places of employment/residence.<sup>40</sup> This process assisted in teasing out key issues pertinent to the issue of focus and “testing” interview questions.

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<sup>39</sup> Please see: Michael Fry “Scotland Alone” *Prospect Magazine* Issue 129 (December 2006). Available online at: “Scotland Alone” [Michael Fry http://prospect-magazine.co.uk/article\\_details.php?id=7973](http://prospect-magazine.co.uk/article_details.php?id=7973). [Internet accessed November-December 2006 and September 2007]

<sup>40</sup> A list of the people met with is available upon request.

(c) *Active participation in a conference* as Rapporteur for the University of Peace (Toronto campus) conference on *Role of Diasporas in Peacebuilding and Development*.

(d) *Preparation and research for travel overseas and in Canada*. This entailed establishing appropriate dates of travel, researching and establishing contacts to interview, preparing a schedule of formal interviews and itineraries (including meeting times, dates, and locations, *etc.*). Initial contact with potential interviewees was accomplished via email. This was followed up with a formal interview letter outlining the purpose and scope of this investigation, definitions, and issues of confidentiality.

At the end of the background research phase, interview letters and interview questions and were finalized. The interview questions were formally evaluated for their rigour by my Mentor for the Fellowship.<sup>41</sup>

#### **(ii) Interviews with Leading Policymakers in the UK, South Africa, and Canada and Site Visits (November 2006-March 2007)**

Travel and research in the **United Kingdom** and **South Africa** entailed conducting in-depth interviews with informants, which required travel to and within these countries, as well as using the opportunities of being in these countries to advance learning and understanding of these countries and the issue of focus through site visits to libraries, museums *etc.*<sup>42</sup>

At the end of the November 15, 2006-December 23, 2006 period a total of **18 formal interviews were conducted overseas (8 in the UK and 10 in South Africa)** with experts from different walks of life and different backgrounds. Other individuals, though not formally interviewed, were also either met for general interest purposes and/or to establish further contacts in the area of the issue of focus. The ultimate goal of these efforts was to target “leaders” who were knowledgeable about issues of multiculturalism/diversity, the pluralism of identity, and/or foreign policy at the highest possible level. This methodology was employed primarily to tap into the experience and expertise of leaders, which was critical in a research area that is relatively new in Canada. Admittedly, however, this also meant being opportunistic as to who was available, when, and where.

From January 19, 2007-March 14, 2007, a total of **10 formal interviews were conducted in Canada**. This brought **the total number of formal interviews conducted for this investigation to 28 (8 in the UK + 10 in South Africa + 10 in Canada)**. As per the research in the UK and South Africa, other individuals in Canada, though not formally interviewed, were also either met for general interest purposes and/or to establish further contacts in the area of my issue of focus. Again, the ultimate goal of my efforts was to target “leaders” who were knowledgeable about issues of multiculturalism/diversity, the pluralism of identity, and/or foreign policy at the highest possible level. As with the UK and South Africa, this also meant being opportunistic as to who was available, when, and where in Canada.

Please see the **Annex** for the final list of interviewees used in this investigation.

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<sup>41</sup> A copy of a standard interview letter and interview question structure is available upon request.

<sup>42</sup> These site visits were undertaken at my own expense.

All interviews were recorded on an Olympus digital voice recorder and then subsequently uploaded onto a laptop computer. Interviews were transcribed and then triaged under headings/subjects of common themes around definitive ideas, issues, tensions, *etc.* to decipher major points. The statements made by interviewees were also “measured” for their intensity; that is, the degree of emphasis placed on particular statements, whether interviewee statements represented minority views or were views shared by many, *etc.*

### **(iii) Formal Feedback Opportunities and Knowledge Development (March-August 2007)**

While opportunities for testing ideas were available throughout the Fellowship period, major *formal* opportunities for feedback came in the form of the following:

- **Featured guest on radio program** “A Luta Continua (The Struggle Continues...)” CKCU FM 93.1 (*March 16, 2007*)
- **Panel Presentation at Third Annual Maytree Leadership Conference 2007:** “Something Old, Something New: Canada in the New Millennium.” Panel Presenter on *A New Multiculturalism: Moving the Discourse Forward* (*May 1-May 3, 2007*)
- **Published article** entitled “Minority Views: A Review of *Canada Among Nations 2006: Minorities and Priorities*” The article appeared in the Literary Review of Canada, Vol. 15, No. 6, pp. 10-11 (*July-August 2007*)
- **Panel Presentation at 76<sup>th</sup> Annual Couchiching Summer Conference 2007** “The Stranger Next Door: Making Diversity Work.” Panel Presenter on the session *What Does Citizenship Mean in a World Without Borders?* (*August 8-August 12, 2007*)

In addition to the above, the March-August 2007 period provided opportunities for knowledge development by *formal* participation in the following conferences (in addition to those above were presentations were made):

- **Ninth National Metropolis Conference:** “Exploring Canada’s Diversity Today and Tomorrow” Fairmont Royal York, Toronto, Ontario, Canada (*March 1-March 4, 2007*)
- **Association of Canadian Studies Conference:** “Canadian Rights and Freedoms: 25 Years Under the Charter”, University of Ottawa (Ottawa, Ontario, Canada). (*April 16-17, 2007*)

### **(iv) Synthesis of Findings (August-September 2007)**

The final months of this investigation were used to synthesize thoughts and findings into this final *Synthesis Report*. This Report is part of a series of complementary documents developed for and delivered to the Walter and Duncan Gordon Foundation for my Global Youth Fellowship 2006.

### III. Results

As is expected when one undertakes interviews of a spectrum of leaders from diverse backgrounds, experience, and profession, discerning uniformity of opinion can be a challenge. This section will highlight some of the general themes that arose in the interviews across the following dimensions: (A) Definitions; (B) Multiculturalism and Diversity; (C) Multiculturalism, Diversity, and Foreign Policy; and, (D) Pluralism of Identity and Foreign Policy. Wherever possible, direct quotations are used from the interviews to illustrate a larger point common to respondents.

#### ***A. Definitions***

Generally speaking, **multiculturalism** was defined by interviewees in three major ways: (1) Multiculturalism as an *ideology of society*, where a society may encourage those whom it receives (immigrants in particular) to retain their ethnic, cultural, religious and to a certain degree linguistic backgrounds; (2) Multiculturalism as a *demographic fact* wherein a society is composed of people from different ethnic, cultural, linguistic and religious backgrounds due primarily to immigration; and (3) Multiculturalism as a *policy instrument* whereby a government's policies actively provide services that are sensitive to or accommodate the different backgrounds of people and/or encourage those from different ethnic, cultural, linguistic and religious backgrounds to retain those backgrounds.

Respondents approached the questions posed primarily from the perspective of (1) and (2). This was in keeping with the definition presented to them; that is “non-homogeneity in societies a result of active immigration from non-traditional sources” (see **Section IIA** above), as “non-homogeneity” could be part of an *ideology of society* or a *demographic fact*.

With regards to the term **diversity**, many informants approached the term in a similar vein to the definition provided but also, in certain circumstances, saw the term as a basket containing other specific identity variables. For instance, in some cases, “diversity” also was taken to include gender, sexuality, and disability, in addition to diversity as a result of immigration (*e.g.* Indian, Pakistani, Malay, *etc.*) or history (*e.g.* francophone, Aboriginal, Afrikaner, Zulu, Scottish, *etc.*). However, the term was not usually seen to be broader than these variables to include profession, political inclination, *etc.* In general, when the term **pluralism of identity** (often shortened to **pluralism**) was introduced, it became clear that there was generally a distinction between “diversity” and the “pluralism of identity,” as the latter was taken to contain a much broader range of identity variables than just “diversity,” such as profession, political inclination, *etc.* in addition to those usually specified (*e.g.* ethnicity, religion, culture, race, language, gender, sexuality, disability, *etc.*)

The term **foreign policy** was also generally taken to encompass the definition provided. In some cases, interviewees used the terms “security policy,” “defence policy” and/or “international development policy” as distinct from “foreign policy” but in general “foreign policy” was taken to include all of these dimensions and more; that is the “actions, roles and expression of a country beyond its borders.”

Respondents also acknowledged the contextual nature of the terms **multiculturalism**, **diversity** and, to a certain extent, **pluralism**. For instance, several South African interviewees noted that “multiculturalism” and “pluralism” in South Africa were to a certain degree “dirty” words, as they were utilized during the apartheid years as part of the justification for laws, policies, and programs of separateness. In addition, some South African informants acknowledged that public understanding of “diversity” also often referred to policies in the workplace such as affirmative action towards people of colour, women, people with disabilities, *etc.* Furthermore, some Canadian interviewees noted the semantic difference between the use of the term “multiculturalism” in the rest of Canada outside of Québec and in Québec, where “interculturalism” is the preferred term.

Informants were encouraged to stick to the definitions provided and to base their answers on these definitions. However, where interviewees were observed to be uncomfortable with the definitions, they were encouraged to explain why. If a serious problem existed and/or the definitions provided were persistently hampering the flow of discussion, interviewees were permitted to use definitions that could most clearly elucidate the points they wished to make. Some preferred to leave issues of “semantics” aside, and so instead focussed on trying to get their points across.

### ***B. Multiculturalism and Diversity***

Interviewees were asked to deliberate and share their views on some of the major issues they felt were associated with multiculturalism and diversity. This was done in order to understand, from the interviewees’ perspectives, what they felt were the major domestic issues around multiculturalism and diversity affecting their countries. Furthermore, this was done to infer whether any of the major points raised could have possible implications for foreign policy beyond those articulated by respondents when they were asked questions directly linking multiculturalism, diversity and foreign policy ((as in (C) below)).

The following are some of the major (*cross-cutting*) issues that arose:

#### **(i) Historical “Solitudes”**

Many interviewees felt that there was a need to *address the internal historical divisions within countries*, in particular between “groups” or “peoples” that have been in these countries for a long time (henceforth, “historical groups”). In the case of Canada, this referred primarily to the divisions between Aboriginal peoples, francophones/French Canada (in particular, Québec), and anglophones/English Canada. In the case of South Africa, the challenge was primarily between races, especially black and white. This issue was less problematic in the case of the UK; however, two British interviewees did note Scottish nationalism as a potential threat to the unity of Britain, but this point was conveyed with a lesser sense of urgency than in the case of Canada and South Africa.

#### **(ii) National Identity**

Several respondents referred to the challenges arising from *divisions cutting across all groups*, whether between historical groups, historical groups and groups of immigrant newcomers,

or within historical groups and/or within groups of immigrant newcomers. In many instances, the point was raised in terms of *what it meant to be part of a national political community*.<sup>43</sup> Interviewees noted, for example, the challenge of “...(articulating)...the values that are shared” (as one Canadian put it) and the rights and obligations around citizenship. This was particularly true for the UK and Canada and less so in South Africa primarily because of the weight given by many South African respondents to the South African Constitution, which some felt articulated, at least partially, what it meant to be part of South Africa as well as the rights and responsibilities of being a South African. Other respondents in all three countries noted that to a certain degree there existed a “ridiculous obsession with constructed identities” around national identity and a danger in “...(fixing) notions of...diversity...and culture (when they) are fluid and flowing and adaptable and necessarily so.” Some noted that national identity is more institutional and procedural (*e.g.* parliament, rule of law, *etc.*) and is therefore of a more “civic” variety than based on traditional conceptions of a nation (*e.g.* based on ethnicity, a common language, *etc.*)

The challenge of maintaining solidarity, collective action, or even the distinctiveness of particular groups (*e.g.* Québec, Zulu, *etc.*) within a broader national political community in the face of immigration and/or diversity was also raised. However, as one British interviewee noted, there is also a tendency to make debates around multiculturalism and/or diversity too focussed on particular groups and/or regions (*i.e.* such as people living in urban centres) and thus one needs to see these issues in a broader light.

Interestingly, and related to the examination of the pluralism of identity below, another British informant pointed out that the debates around multiculturalism, diversity, and national identity may be part of a new challenge altogether: “Britain has surpassed conventional understandings of diversity, same goes for Canada and lots of other societies as well...” The respondent described this new reality as a “condition” of “super-diversity,” which he noted these countries are only just beginning to grapple with.

### **(iii) “Integration” & Economics**

Here, the point raised concerned *unresolved practical aspects of economic, social, and political integration*. Some respondents noted that the debates around multiculturalism and/or diversity “...hide the dreadful conditions people are living in” and the importance of contending with practical issues associated with multiculturalism and/or diversity (*e.g.* foreign credential recognition, job provision, poverty, education, service provision in indigenous languages, *etc.*). As one South African interviewee noted, there exists in South Africa deep challenges associated with class due to historical injustices but also increasingly as a result of recent immigration from other African countries into South Africa, particularly with regards to employment opportunities. The respondent felt this is part of the reason xenophobia towards other Africans exists in South Africa and continues to remain high.

At a broader level, one Canadian informant observed the importance of general economic issues associated with diversity: “The future of Canada in a globalized world rests with our ability to retain and attract global talent.” This respondent also posited that while economic

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<sup>43</sup> For an interesting perspective from the UK on this, please see: Jack Straw, “The Way We Are” *The World Today* (May 2007): 4-6.

necessity is dictating the need for immigrants in Canada, this must also be executed to retain and attract these immigrants if Canada is to remain fiscally healthy and wealthy into the future.

#### **(iv) Power and the “Business of Possession”**

Many interviewees described the challenges of multiculturalism and diversity in terms of *power and power sharing*. For instance, one South African respondent pointed out: “...terms like ‘tolerance’ don’t do enough, we have to address this at a deeper level...it is not just a matter of opening up centres to allow marginalized people in but reconfiguring the centres themselves...” Another South African interviewee observed:

“There is a tendency to expect newcomers into (a) space to conform to the values and beliefs that are already established in that space, which in a way negates the reality of diversity that is...in that particular space. (There is)...the expectation for people who are new in some of these spaces to assimilate into the culture that is already hegemonic...”

One British respondent stated what he believed was a sense of loss experienced by (primarily) white people in that country: “I suppose it is a ‘business of possession’...suddenly feeling that society has just slipped through their fingers, (that) it changed overnight.” Interestingly, one Canadian informant also noted the need to keep actively abreast of the power struggles of newer minorities in society when other groups are debating power-sharing among themselves. This interviewee asks: “How do we make sure that the ongoing dynamic between the English and the French does not come at the expense of creating the exclusion of others?” a question the interviewee believed was the instigator of the Canadian Multiculturalism Policy itself.

#### **(v) Institutions**

Some of the major points around the notion of “institutions” centred on the *representativeness* of institutions and *trust* in these institutions. At one level, representativeness had to do with (1) *adequate representation and reflection of multiculturalism and/or diversity* in the institutions of society: government, education, the private sector, *etc.* At another level, representativeness had to do also with (2) *reconciliation*; for example, one South African informant pointed out: “If we don’t have the same map of our past, we are not going to be able to find one another on our road in the present and our road in the future.”

As one Canadian respondent remarked, trust in institutions by an increasingly diverse population is also key. Here, the interviewee pointed specifically to the perceived lack of trust in institutions such as the Royal Canadian Mounted Police as a result of the Maher Arar case.<sup>44</sup>

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<sup>44</sup> Please see <http://www.maherarar.ca/> for more information.

## (vi) Politicians, the Media and the Popular Press

Finally, several informants opined that many of the challenges associated with multiculturalism and diversity are due to *misconceptions generated or sustained by politicians, the media and the popular press*. As one British interviewee noted, public discourse on issues of multiculturalism and diversity “...see diversity as directly linked to a breakdown in social cohesion...” when, in fact, this respondent felt that “...the greatest fear is fear itself.” This same informant also pointed out that a major challenge associated with multiculturalism and diversity is “...poor political leadership by way of educating and leading the public to recognize that (multiculturalism and diversity) aren’t threats...”

Some Canadian informants raised the concern that the debates in Europe in particular were having a disproportionate influence on the debates around multiculturalism in Canada. These respondents were apprehensive that the effect of the European debates would be to derail some of Canada’s “successes” with multiculturalism.

## C. Multiculturalism, Diversity, and Foreign Policy

Generally speaking, several respondents across all three countries agreed that multiculturalism and diversity are important for foreign policy. Many believed that this was true because they saw foreign policy as a means of **defining and expressing what and who their country represented abroad** (that is, what their country “stood for”) as well as what their country’s **national interests and values** are. In other words, because their countries were multicultural and diverse, many respondents believed this should naturally be expressed in their country’s foreign policy and should also possibly inform what their country’s national interests and values are.

At the same time, however, some interviewees were not always sure if there was a direct relationship between multiculturalism and/or diversity and foreign policy. Nevertheless, these informants believed **some sort of relationship** between these variables existed, at least indirectly that is. For instance, with regards to Canada, some cited the role of Québec in keeping Canada out of the war in Iraq, or Canadian involvement in Haiti and the Ukraine as a result of the Diaspora groups from these countries in Canada.

While the above were generally true across most respondents, it is worthwhile as well to note some of the other opinions that existed on this front. In particular instances, informants observed that they had **not previously given much thought to the role or relevancy of multiculturalism and/or diversity in foreign policy** but that this presented an **interesting angle** to view any or all of the issues of multiculturalism, diversity, and foreign policy. Other informants felt that multiculturalism and/or diversity were either **negligible** or **should not be included** in foreign policy. This vein of opinion usually contended that foreign policy was, in the words of these interviewees, hard-headed “realism,” “realpolitik,” or based principally on one or all of national interests, national values, and/or economic interests. As one South African respondent noted, given the foreign policy actions of “Western” democracies, what a country’s foreign policy actions boil down to is essentially based on economic considerations; in his words, that foreign policy mantra is “It’s the

economy, stupid!” Thus, matters of multiculturalism and/or diversity are **essentially peripheral concerns** in the conduct and decision-making processes of foreign policy.

Finally, one Canadian informant noted that multiculturalism and/or diversity do not have roles in foreign policy because they were simply just not necessary for exemplary foreign policy, which in this respondent’s view was evident in the relatively (ethnically/racially) homogeneous countries of Scandinavia.

Interestingly, while many informants felt that the relationship among multiculturalism and/or diversity and foreign policy could not be clearly defined precisely, many also felt that their countries were, to a certain degree, **already taking advantage of the multicultural and/or diverse make-up of their countries for foreign policy purposes**. For instance, in Canada, informants noted the role of Québec at UNESCO, Canadian participation in *la Francophonie* and the Commonwealth, consultations with Diaspora groups on foreign policy issues, and so forth. In South Africa, some pointed out South Africa’s role as the head of the Non-Aligned Movement, historically cordial relationships between South Africa and India, South African participation in the India-Brazil-South Africa (IBSA) Forum, and South African (peacekeeping) roles in Northern Ireland and the Middle East. In the UK, while mention was made by an informant of the role of British Pakistanis and British Indians on British foreign policy positions *vis-à-vis* Kashmir, generally respondents felt British foreign policy often was a “closed-door” process formulated by “experts” ((a point we will encounter in **C(v)** below)) In fact, these respondents noted the challenges Britain is currently facing with regards to its immigrants, and Muslims in particular, as being a result of such a “closed-door” process, especially when Britain is conducting a “War on Terror” and given its active role in the Iraq War.

The following are some of the major (*cross-cutting*) issues that arose during the interviews:

### **(i) Living by Example and Looking Inside**

Several respondents posited that multiculturalism and/or diversity matter for foreign policy primarily because they can form the basis of whether a state’s actions can be considered credible. That is, *how a state behaves towards its own multicultural and/or diverse population is the basis of its foreign policy credibility inside and outside its borders*. This position was represented in many forms. As one Canadian informant remarked, “One of the things Canada can contribute is to do things well at home, to serve as an example of a society that is at least trying to build a decent...multicultural society.” This point was supported by another informant who, speaking on Aboriginal issues in Canada stressed the need for a coherent domestic policy in the Canadian North, which could reinforce what Canada is doing internationally. Another Canadian respondent, upon being asked about the relationship between multiculturalism, diversity, and foreign policy, stated the following:

“(These issues go) into the very essence of egalitarianism, inclusiveness ...these are Canadian values...you can take the same values, the same principles, and (use them) on the international front...(including the) values of equity, fairness, democratic participation...”

One South African informant took inspiration from a much cherished political document in South Africa: “...whatever space we occupy in any part of the world, we must become active

agents to promote, encourage, and affirm the highest ideals and principles that are enshrined in our Constitution...”

Finally, another South African noted:

“We are still in the process of selling the idea of every South African seeing it to be it in their personal interest to work towards a South African identity. I don’t think we have reached a point where we can say we have a consensus about our diverse nature as a South African nation that we can use to sell or take certain policy approaches on the basis on that identity. It is still something we are trying to grapple with...”

## **(ii) Role of Diasporas and Transnationalism**

Many respondents spoke of the role of *Diasporas and/or transnationalism in the development, shaping, or execution of foreign policy*. At a general level, a Canadian informant remarked that:

“Part of what it is to reflect and represent...a diverse society is to reflect and represent the diverse ties this creates with other parts of the world...Relationships with homelands and with ancestral countries and so on...(are) an important dimension of ethnic identity...I don’t think we can successfully create a decent multicultural society within Canada if we are not taking into account in our foreign policy the identities, priorities, and concerns (these) people have.”

The use of Diaspora groups and/or transnational networks was seen *positively* by some because of the assets that Diasporas and transnationalism could bring: linguistic skills, knowledge of culture/country, religion, business contacts, networks, and so forth. Several South African respondents noted the same, particularly given the historical immigration to that country. One British interviewee stated, “...when you have countries where Diaspora communities are quite large, then those people should have at least a proportionate say in the foreign policy that is being done in their name...it doesn’t even need to have a ‘multiculturalism’ tag to it...”

However, Diasporas and/or transnationalism were also seen in a *negative* and/or *challenging* light as well. Speaking generally, one informant pointed out that:

“...Diversity can give a strength (to foreign policy but)...it can lead to a temptation, which if surrendered to, will undermine both Canada’s interests in...a foreign policy point of view and, in the medium to long-term undermine diversity, a willingness to express diversity, in our society itself.”

This interviewee was particularly concerned that surrendering to diversity in the form of Diaspora groups,

“...may create a backlash that will undermine support for multiculturalism, diversity and immigration...”

A feeling existed among some respondents that while lobbying is a creative, natural, and legitimate part of any democratic society, the lobbying efforts of *Diaspora groups’ had the*

*potential to undermine, unduly influence, were in conflict with, or were actually derailing the foreign policy interests* of their countries. This was particularly true of some of the Canadian respondents, although some British and South African respondents also noted the same point. Furthermore, it was believed by these respondents that *politicians often leveraged political advantage by appealing to Diaspora groups* through their foreign policy actions. One British respondent felt that immigration was an important way to understand other countries better but was concerned that engaging with Diasporas would lead to an "...arms-race of protest" and hoped that ultimately the loyalty of people would be to Britain. On the latter, a South African informant noted the historical challenge Diasporas posed to the forming of the apartheid-led South African republic. This respondent remarked that during the apartheid era, particularly prior to the referendum making South Africa a republic, there was a tendency by those in the Afrikaner population to refer to people of British background (men, I would presume) as having a "salt penis," for it was believed that these people had one foot in South Africa and the other in Britain; that is, they had not quite made their minds up as to where their loyalties lay.

### **(iii) Conflicts and Ignorance**

The notion of *instigating and/or exacerbating conflicts* was also a particular concern of some respondents, primarily those from Canada. While one Canadian informant noted, "We have to acknowledge...that when people come from politically complicated situations they will have politically complicated ties to actors in their home country," there was a perception that (1) *multicultural groups in particular will and/or could engage in illegitimate political activities* such as terrorism and/or be involved with this overseas. In some respects, some people spoke to this in terms of the domestic challenge of integration and ghettoization. Furthermore, some respondents were apprehensive that (2) *multicultural groups would or could import their conflicts* into the "host" country. Finally, a few respondents felt that (3) there was a risk that their countries' *foreign policy positions may instigate or exacerbate conflict* in multicultural and/or diverse groups, partly through appealing to certain groups in their countries and/or partly through *an ignorance of the multicultural and/or diverse realities in their countries*. On the latter, two Canadian informants cited the strong stance the Stephen Harper Conservative government took *vis-à-vis* the Israel-Lebanon situation in 2006. A British interviewee also pointed out:

"...There is the issue of whether or not the nature of British foreign policy has caused serious problems for certain people or groups of people in Britain...(who) have reacted powerfully against it and felt for whatever reason, good or bad, they could not influence it by normal means..."

### **(iv) Racism in Foreign Policy**

A few respondents also felt that there existed undercurrents of *racism in the conduct of foreign policy*. Speaking of the Muslim community and the perceived unwillingness on their part to share information on their brethren who may engage in terrorism, one British interviewee observed:

"The majority of the Catholic community (in the UK) hated the violence of the I.R.A. but they had a sufficient dislike of British policy not to inform the security authorities...The prejudice was such that after the 7/7 bombings (in London), the Ministers and the press

started talking about ‘Muslim terrorists,’ but nobody had talked about ‘Catholic terrorists’...they talked (instead) about the I.R.A. because the I.R.A. had a completely well known name...(but, well) Al-Qaeda has a perfectly known name?!”

Speaking on the struggle against apartheid, one South African interviewee emotively noted:

“...Canada and the world said that they didn’t support apartheid (but) they pussyfooted around the apartheid regime for decades. I guarantee you that if it was white South African children who were being put into prison, who are under 14 years old, 5000 of them killed in townships, not only would Canada and other G8 countries impose economic sanctions immediately, they would send the army. So...there is a lot of subtle racism involved.”

Finally, another South African interviewee posited:

“Being a black-led country is a challenge because of the dominance or prevalence of racism, which is mostly unconscious...(and) continues to influence people to look at black people as blacks first and distracts them from appreciating their intelligence, creativity, originality, etc.”

#### **(v) Foreign Policy and Dialogue**

Finally, many respondents stressed that *the making of foreign policy and foreign policy itself are “closed-door” processes*. Several informants emphasized the need for “opening the doors” to people of multicultural and/or diverse backgrounds and providing fair opportunities for employment, consultation, engagement, and public dialogue. However, some also recognized the challenges associated with this. The following illustrates some of these sentiments:

“In foreign and security policy, there is an assumption that ‘the experts’ will do the best thing on our behalf...it is still a very closed world”

“Because the foreign policy community has a tendency to be closed off and not be...the most diverse group, it leaves it vulnerable to hijacking by particular calls...The nature of the machine, the fact that it is a closed shop, leaves it vulnerable, so that when it does engage, it runs the risk of only engaging partially...”

“I would like to see multiculturalism and diversity manifest (themselves) in a slightly less arrogance in foreign policy...”

“If you deny people a voice persistently, and even worse, you don’t have a debate...then you are asking for trouble in the long run. Multiculturalism should not be limited to schools...foreign policy should be in there”

“The challenge for Canada is to maintain a middle ground in a world that is changing, to listen to the diversity of voices in a balanced way...”

“It is the responsibility of government to ensure that...avenues are open to all and not captured by some groups to the exclusion of others. We have to make sure that the mechanisms of consultation are credible.”

#### ***D. Pluralism of Identity and Foreign Policy***

From an interviewer's perspective, casting a wide net that ranged from multiculturalism and diversity to the pluralism of identity where identity variables could theoretically be virtually limitless, presented an opportunity to examine issues hitherto partially explored for foreign policy. Like multiculturalism and diversity issues, the pluralism of identity was seen as **generally relevant** for foreign policy. Furthermore, many felt that **a relationship existed between the pluralism of identity and foreign policy**. However, respondents were always not sure if this was a direct relationship. Some informants articulated that they had **not previously given much thought to the role or relevancy of the pluralism of identity in foreign policy but that this presented a novel and/or interesting angle**. Finally, several respondents also inferred that their countries, to a certain extent, were **already taking advantage of the pluralism of identity for foreign policy purposes**.

These general results are not surprising primarily because multiculturalism, diversity, and the pluralism of identity are interrelated and mutually reinforcing; that is, they are not antithetical concepts. Yet, where novelty lay was in prompting interviewees to consider the possibilities when multiple identities and affiliations factored into foreign policy. In some cases, this yielded responses that were extensions of the points raised in (C) above. In others, the details introduced represented contradictions. This is expected when one is testing new ideas.

Nonetheless, the information divulged presented an important occasion to consider what perspectives come to bear when notions of multiculturalism and diversity are expanded to incorporate multiple identities and affiliations. The following are some of the major (*cross-cutting*) issues that arose during the interviews:

##### **(i) Limited Understanding**

In general, numerous interviewees noted that while having a pluralism of identity could be important for policy, there existed a *limited understanding of what having a pluralism of identity means for policy generally and foreign policy in particular*. This limited understanding of the pluralism of identity extended to include variables such as geography and diversity of land and peoples relation to it. Nonetheless, for most respondents, the pluralism of identity was described in relation to the multiple identities and affiliations people have.

To wit, many felt that policy thinking often was reduced to general identifiers such as race, religion, gender, disability, *etc.* with an inadequate comprehension of what the implications for policy could be when people have multiple identities and affiliations and/or when these variables conflict or interact. Giving an example from the domestic context, one British interviewee articulated:

“We have disability (legislation), gender legislation, but only recently...(do) we...(have) legislation for age discrimination, sexual orientation discrimination, etc...there is a recognition...of the interplay of issues: you can be a black disabled woman, or a gay Asian young person, and how do these all interplay? There has been a lot of...(questions) on this, on the meaning of different peoples identities and the impact (of these identities) on them...because this is the reality of peoples' lives. I hope this will be enhanced (and there

will be) cross-pollination. The reality is that we often label people and we see someone and say, 'that's a Muslim woman because she is wearing a headscarf.' But she is a woman, who might be outspoken in her community or outside; she may be an academic, or doctor...I think we have been in our silos...I look forward to when that changes."

Another respondent echoing the above informant's point noted the following practical example:

"...(The) sense of multiplicity is not in the public sphere as much as it should be and also it's been a problem in various domains of policy and practice...for instance, social workers...(and) police officers have been put through various kinds of multicultural awareness and anti-racist training, which is a good thing...but its been to the extent that it has created no-go areas in their own head. As pointed out by some women's groups, police or social workers will not intervene sometimes in situations of domestic violence, saying that this is 'Asian culture'...(This) has led to a backfiring...because it treats people just according to particular dimensions of their lives..."

Finally, with regards to foreign policy, the following represents some general viewpoints expressed along the lines of a limited understanding of the pluralism of identity.

"I think when people sit down and formulate foreign policy, the issues of pluralism get sidelined, but ironically only by understanding peoples many identities and affiliations can you solve many of our key questions."

"I am not sure what the outcomes of pluralism in foreign policy would look like but if we did (look at this deeper) there might be some unintended and interesting outcomes."

## **(ii) Multiplicity as Belonging**

Several informants viewed the *pluralism of identity as equivalent to multiple belongings*. As one respondent noted,

"I think this notion of multiple identities is a way of allowing people to feel an appurtenance, a sense of belonging to a society, any society, but also to see themselves as citizens of the world and recognize the inter-dependence of themselves with the multiple communities they are part of, including the ensemble of the communities of communities."

Returning to the theme of transnationalism, one British interviewee observed,

"...it is assumed that people who have intense transnational connections whether political, economic, social, familial...are less integrated in the UK..."

Stating the potentiality (positive and negative) of transnationalism, one Canadian informant said:

"...Cultural ties and identities of people are more able to be shared, rooted in the homeland than 50 years ago...this may go away, but this may not because the circumstances are different than they were 50 years ago...Transnational relations are deepening...ethnic

enclaves will be strengthened; urbanization will contribute to this...(B)ut the transnational effects, through communications, transportation, business relations, flow of capital, will strengthen these enclaves even further and they will be a social force to take much more seriously...to be incorporated into political life and so on..."

Interestingly, it was when the notion of pluralism of identity was introduced that the idea of dual citizenship was raised. *Dual citizenship was in many instances seen as more of a challenge than an opportunity*, particularly by British and Canadian interviewees (South African respondents generally did not raise dual citizenship as an issue). Here, the issue for some British and Canadian informants was the tension between loyalty to the "receiving" or "adopted" country and loyalty to their "home" or another country and/or the technical, diplomatic, and legal issues involved when "attachments" or "identities" conflict (e.g. when dual citizens get into trouble with the law, or worse are tortured and/or killed).

Finally, several respondents noted the domestic and foreign policy challenges associated with pinning down specific identities. One South African interviewee pointed out:

"I think this is what we are trying to get people to think about, that is, multiple identities, multiple roles...because... it is the singularity that causes the conflict which spirals out of control. In Africa, I think there was a pan-Africanism where your African identity was more important than your tribal identity, and this was very important in South Africa (at that time). But to be honest, even this is problematic: what is being 'African' mean? Ideology? Skin colour?..."

### **(iii) Complexity and Unity in Plurality**

Many informants felt that the notion of *the pluralism of identity makes thinking about foreign policy more complex*. That is, in having a basket of identities and affiliations that could encompass everything from ethnicity, religion, race, *etc.* to identities such as those attached to athleticism (e.g. triathlete), how does one think about these things for foreign policy purposes? As one interviewee astutely remarked, "As soon as you pin down an affiliation in policy, you marginalize somebody. It is learning about the most important connections which influence outcomes the most, and working along the grains of these to make the best policies..."

In some cases, respondents felt it would be unrealistic to expect foreign policy officials, particularly in a post-September 11, 2007 environment to be thinking of peoples multiple identities and affiliations when "Western" policymakers and publics are operating in a highly "securitized" environment. On the latter, a British interviewee observed:

"Until you break the void that security policy is not only security policy *per se*, but (is) social, economic, political, cultural...until you break out of that mould, it will be impossible for questions of pluralism to genuinely break foreign policy thinking."

Finally, some informants expressed concern about the ability to locate common and/or unifying identities and affiliations that could inform foreign policy in a stream of multiple identities and affiliations. That is, these respondents were anxious about *finding unity in plurality for foreign policy purposes*.

#### **(iv) “Hospitality to Difference”**

For several respondents, the pluralism of identity in foreign policy signified *respect for and sensitivity to the fact that people have multiple identities and affiliations at home and elsewhere*. Furthermore, this “hospitality to difference” represented an opportunity to view the multiple identities and affiliations people have as a representation of the multiple identities and affiliations that exist globally; that is, having *a pluralism of identity is a universal trait*. As one Canadian respondent enunciated, “...pluralism engenders the notion of the hospitality to difference...because what it means is that we all need a sensitivity to difference however you define difference ...” One British informant added that:

“...If you believe pluralism is important in your own society, then it is rather difficult to take a view of the world that we must make everyone like us because we are not one single identifiable set of markers, so there is certainly a kind of isomorphism between the domestic and the international in (this) respect. It should lead to a degree of humility in our foreign policy but I am afraid that has not been so evident in recent years...”

Finally, as another Canadian interviewee noted: “...(the pluralism of identity) offers a global view of the universe that goes beyond being a North American country of European stock, of being a rich country. It offers a pluralistic vision of the universe that is inclusive.”

#### **(v) “Internal Pluralisms”**

A number of respondents noted that *the pluralism of identity ingrains a sensitivity to and recognition of the internal pluralisms of communities*. This was true for both domestic and foreign policy purposes. As one interviewee generally observed:

“Pluralism in the broadest sense acknowledges that even within cultural, ethnic, or religious groups, there is another level of pluralism. People always speak of the ‘Muslim’ community...I always find that problematic because it is not a monolithic community by any means...anymore than even the Christian community. Even within (these) so-called communities, there are internal pluralisms, and we need to recognize that as part of the debate...I think it is lost in the mix a fair bit.”

Similarly, some respondents felt that recognition of differences was important within communities. Speaking of the importance of these distinctions for domestic and foreign policy, and with regards to Aboriginal peoples in Canada, one respondent opined:

“When we first started talking about Aboriginal peoples in Canada...the federal government often talked about ‘Aboriginal peoples’ like (they) were one people. But Aboriginal peoples are not one people at all...A pan-Aboriginal approach to Canadian policy...did not make any sense, because if you have a pan-Aboriginal approach to Canadian policy, then...in your foreign policy work, you will have (that) same approach outside of...(the) country...Now...over a period of time we have been able to convince people that it is necessary to make the distinctions. People did not want to do that, like Aboriginal peoples have one leader....(when they) have more than one leader. These are things that influence the overall landscape of Canada in a broad sense, meaning people and how people live.”

#### IV. Analysis

The themes explored in the previous section were varied and sometimes contradictory, yet they provide a fertile basis to draw some basic analytical inferences for foreign policy. Since the issue of focus concerns itself specifically with *Canadian* foreign policy, the discussion below will be generally restricted to Canada. However, the comparative dimension of the Fellowship investigation has enabled this discussion on Canada to benefit immensely from the rich and varied experiences of the UK and South Africa.

As noted previously in section III(D) above, multiculturalism, diversity, and the pluralism of identity are not antithetical concepts; they are interrelated and mutually reinforcing. If, generally speaking, foreign policy is the actions, roles, and expression of a country beyond its borders, then it is appropriate that multiculturalism, diversity, and the pluralism of identity figure prominently. To a certain degree, this is true of Canada for Canada has attempted not only to be somewhat cognizant of its multicultural and diverse reality in its foreign policy, it has also attempted to be plural as, for example, its global support for gender equality illustrates. Indeed, this was astutely observed by interviewees in general terms as well as through the examples they provided. Furthermore, if some of the Government of Canada's foreign policy statements, practical actions, and financial support are any indication, this premise can be considered generally accurate as well.

Since the end of the Cold War and more recently the terrorist acts of September 11, 2001, many "Western" democracies have been faced with a new breed of concern of how their increasingly diverse citizens could continue to live together in relative peace and stability. Faced with the pressures and institutional fissures of globalization, demography, and (for some) the newer political, economic, and social terrain of an increasingly diverse citizenry, many have reasoned politically against multiculturalism (*e.g.* the Netherlands), questioned its soundness (*e.g.* the United Kingdom) and/or remained steadfast against its formal acknowledgement and/or "institutionalization" (*e.g.* France).

What has made Canada distinctive *vis-à-vis* its contemporaries, however, is the broad support multiculturalism and diversity has enjoyed in Canada, and continues to enjoy notwithstanding this recent (r)evolution. Canada has enjoyed much the same broad support (to a certain degree) in its foreign policy. Yet, with this distinctiveness comes *responsibility*, responsibility primarily because Canada derives a significant share of its credibility, legitimacy and reputation at home and in the world *on the very basis of its multiculturalism and diversity*; that is, multiculturalism and diversity have been *instrumental* to the psyche of what constitutes "Canada." Indeed, arguably, multiculturalism and diversity have become Canada's principal defining features and assets because these variables have historically inspired, and sometimes compelled Canada, into the very areas where the basis of its credibility, legitimacy and reputation is derived: seeking compromise; fostering unity; *etc.* This reality has also guided Canada to the foreign policy roles Canada is best known for, such as peacekeeping, being an "honest broker," multilateralist, and so forth. Multiculturalism and diversity are therefore seen as a critical part of "Canadian identity." Of the innumerable issues that may weigh in on matters of foreign policy, this is also why an important scholar-*cum*-politician would claim the following as a central tenet of *the* Canadian foreign policy challenge: "If we cannot make a multicultural community composed of two national language groups, three founding

peoples, and constituent communities from every nation in the world, no one can. No one will.”<sup>45</sup>

Like many other “Western” democracies, Canada is not sheltered either from the challenges of multiculturalism and diversity generally, as well as their implications for foreign policy. As with its contemporaries, Canada is also undergoing a period of “reappraisal” and self-reflection; periodicals and/or the media are replete with headlines and/or undertones of multiculturalism and diversity issues (e.g. “Do Immigrants Need Rules?”<sup>46</sup>); a new Commission in Québec is examining reasonable accommodation in the province;<sup>47</sup> the funding of religious schools has become a defining and dividing issue in the present election in Ontario, *etc.* Indeed, this is partly because Canada is endeavouring to adapt to a world that is contending with globalization *outside* of its borders. Yet, given the transformative nature of globalization, the institutional lacunae it creates, as well as Canada’s own realities of economic demography, Canada is also simultaneously attempting to adapt *inside* its borders. And, one of the manifestations of the latter is the increasing multicultural, diverse, and I would add, plurality of its population.

What is critical in this reappraisal Canada is presently undergoing (and will be undergoing in the coming decades as Canada will rely more heavily on immigration for its population and economic growth), is that there exist risks and opportunities: *Risks*, that Canada will become complacent and worse yet turn a *volte face* to the very possessions from which it garners its international credibility, legitimacy, and reputation; and, *Opportunities* to continue to build on the distinctiveness of its unique situation with regards to multiculturalism and diversity, with the value-add of the pluralism of identity.

Of these two scenarios, I would hope that Canada would hedge its risks on the side of *opportunity*. However, if multiculturalism, diversity, and the pluralism of identity are to figure in Canadian foreign policy at all as an *opportunity*, then this will beg some (interrelated) questions of Canada such as:

- On what bases can multiculturalism, diversity, and the pluralism of identity generally continue to be used as a rationale of and/or justification for Canadian foreign policy?; and,
- What also needs to be done so that multiculturalism, diversity, and the pluralism of identity can be valid for rationalizing and/or justifying Canadian foreign policy?

The following major (*cross-cutting*) issues, derived from an analysis of the results presented in section (III), suggest what a broad discussion of these questions may entail. General policy recommendations specific to the issues raised below are noted in section (V).

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<sup>45</sup> “Canada in the World: The Challenges Ahead” Beatty Lecture, McGill University. Michael Ignatieff <http://michaellignatieffmp.ca/?p=69>. [Internet accessed on August 30, 2007].

<sup>46</sup> *Maclean’s* Volume 120, Number 8 (March 5, 2007)

<sup>47</sup> For an excellent perspective on identity in Québec, please see: Jocelyn Maclure, *Québec Identity: The Challenge of Pluralism* (Montréal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2003)

*(i) “Il faut (continuer de) cultiver notre jardin”*

Multiculturalism, diversity, and the pluralism of identity can be considered Canadian “national values.” However, they are also more significantly in Canada’s *national interest*, not least because Canada’s international distinctiveness comes from the relative success and positive public support of multiculturalism and diversity. In this realm, Canada has remained a statistical “outlier” *vis-à-vis* its contemporaries, even if this has been somewhat a result of its good fortune.<sup>48</sup> What is intriguing in this regard is that Canada should continue to work to be an outlier. This means that Canada must, at the very least, remain open-minded when it comes to the implications of its multiculturalism, diversity, and the pluralism of identity; be modest in its attempts to export “the Canadian model” of multiculturalism and diversity;<sup>49</sup> not be unnecessarily influenced by the debates happening elsewhere because the Canadian context is different; and, finally, Canada must work harder to give greater attention to the outstanding challenges of multiculturalism and diversity. That is, *il faut continuer de cultiver notre jardin*; Canada must continue to live by example and be a better example for, as noted by interviewees, how *a state behaves towards its own multicultural and/or diverse population is the basis of its foreign policy credibility inside and outside its borders.*

At the most basic level, Canada must contend with some of the longstanding challenges of its *historical diversity*: specifically, Québec’s place in the federation and the challenges confronting Canada’s Aboriginal peoples. It goes without saying that a constitutional settlement with Québec and its place in the Canadian federation is necessary for both Québec and the rest of Canada outside of Québec.<sup>50</sup> This is not least because in Canada constitutional debates have figured prominently in Canadian history, have historically defined the spectrum of francophones/anglophones sense of “belonging” to Canada, but also because constitutions serve as a North Star outlining the “rules of the game” by which people agree to live in political entities such as provinces and federations. From a domestic perspective, therefore, a constitutional agreement is therefore central. However, from a foreign policy perspective, it is also clear that this is important too: Québec (let alone other provinces such as Alberta) are seeking a greater international presence, for as Québec claims, « *ce qui est de compétence québécoise chez nous est de compétence québécoise partout.* »<sup>51</sup> a view shared by other provinces in Canada as well. If, indeed, Québec and other provinces are to be taking prominent roles in multilateral institutions and/or are to be involved in foreign policy generally, then a constitutional solution is important for Québec and, incidentally, the rest of Canada outside of Québec, for this is the basis of political legitimacy and public understanding as to what Canada is at home *and abroad.*<sup>52,53</sup>

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<sup>48</sup> Will Kymlicka, “Marketing Canadian Pluralism in the International Arena” *International Journal* (Autumn 2004): 829-852.

<sup>49</sup> *Ibid.*, at 852.

<sup>50</sup> Michael Ignatieff, *The Rights Revolution* (Toronto: Anansi Press, 2000)

<sup>51</sup> Ministère des Relations internationales, *La politique internationale du Québec: La force de l’action concertée* (Québec: Gouvernement du Québec, 2006): viii

<sup>52</sup> At Alberta’s urging, The Council of the Federation is advancing provincial participation in international activities on matters within their jurisdictions as well as a formalized written agreement on provincial involvement in international negotiations, agreements, and forums. In the Speech from the Throne 2006, Prime Minister Stephen Harper’s government also signalled that it will facilitate provincial participation in the development of Canadian positions that affect areas of provincial responsibility. Please see: “2006 CDFAI Annual Ottawa Conference: “The Provinces and Foreign Policy, A New Federalism?” *Canadian Defence &*

More urgently, however, Canada must confront the longstanding challenges Aboriginal peoples have faced, and are facing. Of all Canadians, Aboriginal peoples have some of the lowest health, education, economic, and social development outcomes.<sup>54</sup> Furthermore, as noted in the introduction to this Report, there will be an increase of 41.9% in *young* adult Aboriginal peoples into the Canadian labour market. This represents a growing social reality in Canada of young Aboriginal peoples who are, and will be, looking for employment, reflection, and representation in Canada's institutions and history,<sup>55</sup> and who will be more globally engaged. Canada cannot expect to continue to have the credibility, legitimacy, and reputation it has without addressing this single most important crisis of its historical diversity.

Finally, unquestionably, there also exist a number of structural challenges that Canada's immigrants and visible minorities are facing. This includes the whole spectrum of issues from foreign credential recognition and poverty, to racism, participation, and reflection, representation and trust in institutions and history.<sup>56,57</sup> These challenges must be addressed now because immigration and (ethnic) diversity in particular will continue to be a fact of Canada well into the future; there is no escaping this, not least because immigration alone will account for Canada's population growth in the next 13 to 39 years.<sup>58</sup> To give the hope of a better life for those coming from abroad who then find themselves without employment or encountering racism is perhaps the surest way for Canada to risk its international credibility, legitimacy, and reputation. This is primarily because Canada is *competing* for immigrants who are not only crucial for Canada's continued health and wealth, but increasingly, these immigrants are transnational; if disillusioned, newcomers have options of leaving physically and/or emotionally. On the contrary, they also can become Canada's greatest assets as citizen ambassadors *vis-à-vis* other immigrants who are looking to come to

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Foreign Affairs Institute [www.cdfai.org/2006annualottawaconference.htm#2006%20CDFAI%20ANNUAL%20OTTAWA%20CONFERENCE%20-%20PANEL%20AUDIO](http://www.cdfai.org/2006annualottawaconference.htm#2006%20CDFAI%20ANNUAL%20OTTAWA%20CONFERENCE%20-%20PANEL%20AUDIO). [Internet accessed September 18, 2007]

<sup>53</sup> I should point out that that while I believe a constitutional agreement is important and fundamental to the future of Canada, I am also nonetheless inclined to agree with Michael Ignatieff when he notes: "Conceding special status for Québec in constitutional negotiations is probably inevitable, but it does nothing to alter each side's view of the historical truth of Québec's place in the Canadian federation... This means we should cease believing that constitutional settlements can end historical arguments. In reality, they can only produce a new basis for ongoing and unending dialogue." Please see: Michael Ignatieff, *The Rights Revolution* (Toronto: Anansi Press, 2000): 135-136.

<sup>54</sup> "Social Development," *Department of Indian and Northern Affairs Canada*. [http://www.ainc-inac.gc.ca/gs/soci\\_e.html](http://www.ainc-inac.gc.ca/gs/soci_e.html). [Internet accessed September 21, 2007]

<sup>55</sup> That there must be "intellectual fairness" in the reading of history is crucial. Indeed, many of the foundations of "Western civilization" and "Western medicine" were deeply influenced and permeated by contributions of different countries and peoples. Theories and histories that pay little to no attention, or worse still ignore, the role of "other" societies restrict the intellectual horizons of so called "established" or "old" Europeans and North Americans. Worse still, they give both those in the "West" and "non-West" a sense of separation and conflict that helps to divide people along a largely artificial line of "West-anti West" confrontation. From: Amartya Sen, *Identity and Violence: The Illusion of Destiny* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2006)

<sup>56</sup> Ratna Omidvar and Ted Richmond, "Immigrant Settlement and Social Inclusion in Canada" *CERIS Policy Matters* No. 16 (March 2005).

<sup>57</sup> Anver Saloojee, "Social Inclusion, Anti-Racism, and Democratic Citizenship" *CERIS Policy Matters* No. 14 (January 2005)

<sup>58</sup> *Statistics Canada* <http://www.statcan.ca/Daily/English/051215/d051215b.htm>. [Internet accessed September 1, 2007]

Canada to make it their home. As with the case of Aboriginal peoples in particular, Canada's institutions and policies will have to adapt to this growing social reality in Canada.

It is difficult for people to be engaged in foreign policy when entrenched structural challenges preventing their full and equal participation remain. The introduction or enhancement of institutional arrangements and other effective public interventions are critical here because they can work to ensure that the barriers to entry, exclusion and/or unequal inclusion immigrants, visible minorities, and Aboriginal peoples are facing can be overcome. As such, these initiatives not only can yield significant differences in outcomes; they can also ensure a *fair* outcome. Even if immigrants, visible minorities, and Aboriginal peoples might be getting more involved or richer, the question remains as to whether they are getting a fair share of the benefits of being involved.<sup>59</sup>

However, while these structural challenges persist and must be contended with, they also provide an argument for simultaneously creating opportunities elsewhere. One specific area of opportunity is building on and enhancing the policies and programs for members of different communities, particularly youth and adults, to engage with and learn about each other and different people in the world (which, incidentally, are not mutually exclusive domains). This bridging of "the local with the local" and "the local with the global" by more actively educating and connecting the multicultural and diverse people and communities in Canada with each other and with people and communities outside of Canada, is key. Several federal, provincial, and territorial government, civil society, and community programs exist for this but they need to be adequately funded and elevated deeper into the public's consciousness. This is because there are commonalities and connections to be found as well as an awareness of "difference" that transcend stereotypes and test assumptions when such opportunities arise. Furthermore, through such educational, civic, and global engagement channels, peoples' ability to make reasoned choices, their participation in civil society, as well as engagement in political and economic processes in Canada and globally, is positively supported.<sup>60</sup>

Given the scope of this Fellowship investigation, it is not the place here for discussing specific policy initiatives to contend with the critical domestic issues raised above, except to say their resolution is vital to Canada *for its foreign policy*. This is partly because some of these challenges, such as Québec's place in the federation or the poverty and social challenges faced by Aboriginal peoples, immigrants, and/or visible minorities, are major and take more than this Report to contend with them. However, for the purposes of this Report, some general recommendations are advanced in section (V). These recommendations are directed to the participation of the federal government, provinces, and territories in foreign policy; the reflection and representation of Aboriginal peoples, immigrants, and visible minorities in social, economic, political, and public institutions; and, finally, the role of youth and adults for active and effective civic and global engagement.

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<sup>59</sup> From: Amartya Sen, *Identity and Violence: The Illusion of Destiny* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2006). Please see his book for a thorough discussion of these points and their relationship to choice and reasoning for identity.

<sup>60</sup> *Ibid.*

## ***(ii) Opening Doors, Knowledge Enhancement, and Institutional Evolution***

The following interrelated issues were noted by respondents in relation to multiculturalism and/or diversity and foreign policy:

- The making of foreign policy and foreign policy itself are “closed-door” processes
- Diasporas and transnationalism present opportunities as well as challenges for foreign policy;
- Conflicts in Canada can arise and/or be exacerbated as a result of their importation from abroad and/or because of the foreign policy positions of the government; ignorance by the government is also an important factor
- Racism is prevalent in foreign policy

One of the repercussions as Canada has become more multicultural is concern over the role of its newcomers in Canadian foreign policy. Indeed, the role of Diasporas and transnationalism has garnered much attention in recent years in the Canadian foreign policy domain by a variety of government institutions, civil society organizations, academics, journalists, and so forth.<sup>61</sup> This is not least because of the evidence on, for example, the potential of Diaspora remittances in international development efforts and the role of transnational migrants in facilitating the transfer of much needed human and financial capital to the developing world.<sup>62</sup> Furthermore, this is also because of the *potential* negative role of Diasporas and transnationalism in foreign policy.<sup>63</sup>

The federal government has attempted to engage Diasporas and probe transnationalism issues for foreign policy through, for example, “Team Canada” missions, consultations on security issues, post-conflict reconstruction, and so forth. To a certain degree, these processes appear to be logical extensions of the federal government’s previous attempts to engage Canadians in foreign policy generally; for example, in the development of formal Government of Canada international policy agendas (*e.g.* the International Policy Statement 2004, Canada in the World 1995, *etc.*) as well as through parliamentary debate on foreign policy concerns/measures that have critical national implications (*e.g.* ballistic missile defence, troop deployments to Afghanistan, *etc.*) and/or testimonies at parliamentary Committees. Furthermore, if these channels fail them, Canadians have the option of sharing their views and concerns on international issues with their federal Members of Parliament. These channels are also available to citizens in the UK and South Africa.

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<sup>61</sup> Please see, for example: Keith Nurse, Diasporas, Migration, and Development in the Caribbean: FOCAL Policy Paper (Ottawa: FOCAL, 2006). Available at: [http://www.focal.ca/pdf/migration\\_caribbean\\_.pdf](http://www.focal.ca/pdf/migration_caribbean_.pdf); “Capacity Building for Peace and Development: Roles of Diaspora” University of Peace <http://www.toronto.upeace.org/diaspora/documents/Final%20Report%20Diaspora%20Forum.pdf>. [Internet accessed September 21, 2007]; “Scoping the Role of Canadian Diaspora in Global Diplomacy and Policy Making” Walter and Duncan Gordon Foundation and the Global College, University of Winnipeg <http://www.uwinnipeg.ca/index/global-college-diaspora>. [Internet accessed September 21, 2007]; David Carment and David Bercuson, eds. The World in Canada and the 3Ds: Diaspora, Demography and Domestic Politics (Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, forthcoming 2007)

<sup>62</sup> Dovelyn Rannveig Agunias, From a Zero-Sum to a Win-Win Scenario: Literature Review on Circular Migration (Washington: Migration Policy Institute, 2006)

<sup>63</sup> Lee Berthiaume, “Growing Diasporas Are Influencing Foreign Policy: Expert” Embassy (21 March 2007)

While this is not the place to discuss whether or not foreign policy should be more “democratic” and/or the virtues and drawbacks of such an undertaking,<sup>64</sup> what is important here is to understand why in spite of the channels available, many interviewees’ still raised the concerns they did. Part of the frustration many respondents in the UK shared emanated from the UK government’s decision to participate in the Iraq war, as well as the ongoing repercussions of this decision. The reasons for engaging in the war were believed to be skewed as a result of little to no engagement with British Muslims and/or with only British Muslims/British Muslim groups of a certain political bent. The repercussions from the war as well as the ensuing policies and/or actions by the British government in the name of “national security” were also seen to be a result of much the same. There was a perception that “government” felt it knew best, when many believed that this was not the case. Some reasons for this included (among others): a belief that the Foreign and Commonwealth Office was too far removed from the multicultural realities on the ground; a dearth of understanding by the department of its own multicultural citizenry; and, a system driven by Machiavellian notions of “national” interest in an international arena of cut-throat competition, where considerations of multiculturalism, diversity, and the pluralism of identity get sidelined.

More than their British counterparts, some Canadian respondents felt that Diaspora groups had the potential to undermine, unduly influence, were in conflict with, or were actually derailing Canadian foreign policy. Several Canadian informants also opined that through their foreign policy, their government was ignorant of their own people. This was the case whether it was the government’s general preoccupation with sovereignty of the Canadian Arctic through military investments at the expense of confronting climate change, which as one respondent noted was more of a priority for the Inuit as their livelihoods were at stake; or, Stephen Harper’s clear support of Israel during the 2006 conflict between Israel and Lebanon.

What the above suggest is that if:

- Foreign policy is a “closed door” to diverse and especially multicultural groups, and is developed by “experts;” and,
- Engagement by foreign policy “experts” with multicultural groups (such as Diaspora), is done for these experts’ selfish purposes and ends, and is done partially, even to the detriment of “laudable” foreign policy; and,
- Either because of their actions (or lack of) and/or their ignorance, those who develop and/or propound foreign policy can instigate and/or exacerbate conflicts between and amongst multicultural groups; and,
- In all of this mix is also the recipe for racism in foreign policy,

Then, one way or another, foreign policy has to “open-up” and be more reflective and aware of Canada’s diverse and especially multicultural population. This implies that foreign policy

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<sup>64</sup> Despite public appetite for participation in foreign policy issues, it seems as though government outreach on foreign policy is generally considered less successful than it could be for reasons spanning from a privileging of elite opinion to accountability on actual policy outputs. Please see: “Accountable Governance and International Reviews: Canadian Foreign Policy as if Democracy Matters?” Paper presented to the meeting of the Canadian Political Science Association. Gerald J. Schmitz. <http://wwwcpsa-acsp.ca/papers-2006/Schmitz.pdf>. [Internet accessed on March 24, 2007].

and those who are involved in it must be knowledgeable and aware of Canada's multicultural and diverse citizenry if it is to be conducting foreign policy in their name in the first place. Part of this is acknowledging that Canada's multicultural population are also *citizens* of Canada, some of whom happen to be generally unequal, if not excluded, voices in Canadian foreign policy. This knowledge is imperative not only in and of itself, but also because this knowledge is key for more informed *choices* in foreign policy. This does not mean that foreign policy should be at the mercy of Diaspora groups, Aboriginal peoples, francophones, or anglophones for that matter; however, it does indicate that engagement on foreign policy issues must be credible and available to all for its own sake and not only because the government finds it in their interest to do so.

One of the institutional responses of the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade in recent years to security and terrorism issues and Canada's multicultural reality has been the creation of a Muslim Communities Working Group. This Working Group was created in response to the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade's report, *Exploring Canada's Relations with Countries of the Muslim World*, as an effort to understanding relations with Muslim majority countries as well as Muslim communities in Canada.<sup>65</sup> While this institutional response is part of a broader effort in "Western" democracies with similar objectives for which the Working Group was created in the first place, the institutionalization of the Working Group raises some interesting issues *vis-à-vis* multiculturalism and/or diversity in Canada. These include: an implied approach to viewing relations with Muslim majority countries and Muslims in Canada from a (disputed) "clash of civilizations"<sup>66</sup> perspective which disregards interactions that go across presumed boundaries; the level of sensitivity to and cognizance of the "on-the-ground" challenges of Muslim integration; the complexities, dynamics, and pluralism within the Muslim community in Canada and abroad; the degree to which this policy response actually creates the potential for exacerbating stigmatization and discrimination and/or makes a community feel they are under the microscope in Canada; and, perhaps most importantly, whether this institutional response is looking in the right direction with regards to issues of multiculturalism, diversity, and the pluralism of identity generally; that is, are there other things broadly speaking that would ingrain a sense of knowledge development for better policy choices that is institutionalized and is acutely aware of the multicultural, diverse, and plural realities in Canada as part of the policy process?

Multiculturalism and/or diversity issues are here to stay in Canada. While security and terrorism issues are important and their threats to Canada are real, it is instructive to note whether Muslims signify "the problem" with respect to terrorism such that outreach and understanding of the Muslim community by a foreign policy department is needed in the form of an institutional response that is targeted specifically only to Muslims. Indeed, understanding the political, social, and economic realities of this "community" is important for better foreign policy (including security and terrorism issues), but so is understanding of

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<sup>65</sup> "Exploring Canada's Relations with the Countries of the Muslim World: Report of the House of Commons Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade" House of Commons, Canada [http://cmtc.parl.gc.ca/cmtc/CommitteeList.aspx?Lang=1&PARLSES=373&JNT=0&SELID=e22\\_4&COM=0STAC=817439](http://cmtc.parl.gc.ca/cmtc/CommitteeList.aspx?Lang=1&PARLSES=373&JNT=0&SELID=e22_4&COM=0STAC=817439). [Internet accessed September 19, 2007]

<sup>66</sup> Samuel P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of the World Order* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996)

broader issues of multiculturalism and/or diversity generally; that is, the response is only one piece of a bigger puzzle. This is particularly intriguing when in fact, 73% of Canadian Muslims describe themselves as “very proud” to be called Canadians and also have very little sympathy for extremists and terrorist groups.<sup>67</sup> Given the growing role of Diaporas and transnationalism, the closed door nature of foreign policy, racism in foreign policy, and so forth, having a Muslim Communities Working Group alone is not enough to contend with the interrelated issues of multiculturalism and/or diversity in Canada for foreign policy. There needs to be a broadening of the horizons of understanding of multiculturalism and/or diversity issues by those who are interested in foreign policy if foreign policy is to be a continued reflection of the citizenry of Canada, not just Muslims alone.

In spite of institutional responses such as the Muslim Communities Working Group, admittedly the federal government has historically *attempted* (though not very successfully) to be sensitive to its public,<sup>68</sup> including its multicultural and/or diverse citizenry.<sup>69</sup> The issue, therefore, is not just whether or not to try to be sensitive to Canada’s multiculturalism and diversity. Rather, the issue is *how to continue* to be sensitive *effectively* to these facts and to develop the institutional bases by which multiculturalism and/or diversity can continue to be used as a rationale of and/or justification for Canadian foreign policy; that is to push the envelope further so that multiculturalism and diversity can continue to be important for Canadian foreign policy.

### ***(iii) Embracing Pluralism***

That people have multiple identities and affiliations seems inherent in any depiction of the human condition. Yet, it remains that a major source of violence, conflict, and misunderstanding is the presumption that people can be uniquely singularized based on one or a few basic identifiers, such as culture, ethnicity, or religion. This is important to recognize because the singularization of these identities, a form of “narcissism of minor difference,”<sup>70</sup> has been used as a mobilizing force in power struggles and for political, economic, and social ends, Canada being no exception. Furthermore, this is also important because history and background are not the only ways of seeing ourselves and the groups to which we belong. Culture, ethnicity, or religion, while important, are not unique in determining our lives and identities; other things like class, race, gender, profession, and politics matter profoundly.<sup>71</sup> Finally, that people have a pluralism of identity matters because, as history has shown, the very conception of identity (that is, how people are

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<sup>67</sup> “Glad To Be Canadian, Muslims Say” Environics-CBC Poll 2007 [Canadian Broadcasting Corporation http://www.cbc.ca/canada/story/2007/02/12/muslim-poll.html](http://www.cbc.ca/canada/story/2007/02/12/muslim-poll.html). [Accessed September 21, 2007]

<sup>68</sup> “Accountable Governance and International Reviews: Canadian Foreign Policy as if Democracy Matters?” Paper presented to the meeting of the Canadian Political Science Association. [Gerald J. Schmitz. http://www.cpsa-acsp.ca/papers-2006/Schmitz.pdf](http://www.cpsa-acsp.ca/papers-2006/Schmitz.pdf). [Internet accessed on March 24, 2007]

<sup>69</sup> For example, keeping Canada out of the Iraq war because of opposition in Québec; the francophone and anglophone international institutions Canada is part of (*e.g.* the Commonwealth and *la Francophonie*); Canadian involvement in Haiti and the Ukraine partly as a result of Canada’s Haitian and Ukrainian Diaporas, *etc.*

<sup>70</sup> Michael Ignatieff, “The Narcissism of Minor Difference” in *Clash of Identities: Media, Manipulation, and Politics of the Self* James Littleton ed. (Engewood Cliffs: CBC & Prentice hall, Inc., 1996)

<sup>71</sup> From: Amartya Sen, *Identity and Violence: The Illusion of Destiny* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2006)

viewed and understood as a result of their identity) influences our thoughts and actions<sup>72</sup> in the policy and practice realms.

Identities are assumed, capitulated, complementing and conflicting in a fluid and dynamic process as a result of the structures and environments that human beings exist in. Identities are also the result of humans' social perception and actions. What is striking about the situation many countries such as Canada find themselves in is that identities and affiliations (*e.g.* francophone, woman, African, civil society leader, *etc.*) are able to seep or "exist" beyond "borders" at a faster pace today, due to a conscientiousness accentuated by communications, technology, travel, economics, and so forth. This, coupled with immigration in "Western" countries of people from "non-traditional" sources has added a new dimension to discussions of belonging, modernity (*e.g.* "post-modernism"), the relevancy of nation-states, and so forth. It is arguable whether the ensuing malaise, tensions, global deprivations and divisions have been as a result of this globalization or, rather, the failings of social, political, and economic arrangements which are contingent and which accompany globalization.<sup>73</sup>

Respondents in all three countries generally contended that there was a limited understanding of the pluralism of identity generally and for foreign policy in particular. They also noted that belonging can have multiple anchors, that pluralism signified "hospitality to difference," is a universalistic trait, and ingrains sensitivity to the internal pluralisms of communities. Finally, interviewees also felt that having a pluralism of identity makes for complexity in foreign policy and finding unity for foreign policy purposes difficult.

As many interviewees pointed out, in spite of the recognition of peoples multiple identities and affiliations, there remains a void in the understanding as to what this means for policy and/or programs for an increasingly diverse citizenry, beyond what has been done so far in areas such as disability legislation, gender equality, sexual orientation, and so forth. What does, for example, being a black female lesbian Ismaili Muslim in Kenya mean for policy and/or programs generally, and foreign policy in particular?

There are several reasons to consider why multiple identities and affiliations matter for foreign policy and/or programs. First, with the tendency to view identity as singular comes the tendency to lump the limited choices and freedoms one may have to that identity variable alone. If a poor, lesbian woman in Kenya feels ostracized from her Ismaili Muslim community, is it because of her political views, sexual orientation, race, economic situation, or neither? Interventions targeting gender equality in the name of cultural sensitivity to the Ismaili Muslim faith alone will not enable her to fully participate in the Ismaili Muslim community, let alone Kenyan society nor the world at large, for the intervention will not rid her of the challenges she faces as a result of her race and/or the dire economic straits she might find herself in.

Second, while there may be errors of *omission* in public and/or foreign policy such as the above example illustrates, to what degree are peoples' choices limited by the errors of *commission*<sup>74</sup> by Canada when it carries out a foreign policy based on singularity. As part of

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<sup>72</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>73</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>74</sup> *Ibid.*

the “West,” Canada was culpable in propping up apartheid-based governments during the Cold War even though it claimed a distinctive tradition of promoting human rights and liberties. Canada moves away from combating global climate change and continues to put the livelihoods of its Inuit population at risk, despite the Inuit’s particular social and economic fragility. A war fighting terrorism and fundamentalism in Afghanistan neglects the deep fissures created by colonial, political and economic realities of foreign policy decisions and actions of which Canada is and has been a part of. All of these acts fuel the false preconception that see and judge Canada as a “Western” (and at home, colonial) country alone, when Canada itself is constituted of peoples with multiple identities and affiliations who share this very feature with the peoples of the world.

Third, understanding peoples’ pluralism of identity also matters when Canada moves in the direction of creating a Muslim Communities Working Group, considers the role of Diasporas and transnationalism in foreign policy, and when debates on dual citizenship are raised (such as in the death of Zahra Kazemi, the election of an “Italian-Canadian” into the Italy’s legislature, the Maher Arar case, and the Lebanon evacuation in 2006, *etc.*). Does dual citizenship mean someone who is a “Casual” Canadian or a German-Canadian lawyer working on the rights of the disabled in Germany, an endeavour likely considered to be “honourable” by most Canadians? Or, a Muslim woman working to promote gender equality in Lebanon, Canada, or at the United Nations? Can the pluralism of identity provide foreign policy with the means by which foreign policy can be used as a tool for the “integration” of immigrants in Canada, such as through programs targeted to Canadians who tend to feel less belonging to Canada (*e.g.* Ethiopian youth) by encouraging them to work overseas in the countries of their origin and/or elsewhere on issues that are important to Canada (*e.g.* poverty alleviation)? At the heart of these issues lie concerns of homogenizing peoples’ identities as if these identities were unique; the lack of emphasis on the internal pluralisms in communities; “Casual” Canadians and where peoples loyalties lie globally;<sup>75</sup> and/or what to do **when** dual citizens find themselves in trouble, or worse still, are tortured and/or killed.

What the above suggest is that, broadly, those who are working on policy issues generally and foreign policy in particular have to develop a better understanding on the importance and relevancy of multiple identities and affiliations for foreign policy purposes. Having one affiliation, be it Lebanese, Muslim, black, gay, a woman, does not negate the fact that this is also what makes one Canadian and connects one to the world beyond Canada, for identities are not in isolation nor are they always conflicting.

Understanding peoples’ pluralism of identity, however, also implies that Canada should seek roles for community leaders (be they Muslim, Haitian, *etc.*) for its foreign policy purposes. However, it also requires that Canada support all of its multicultural, diverse, and plural citizens to interact with each other in its institutions, civil society, politics, and so forth, as opposed to acting only through their own community alone. This is also because at the heart of the matter is expanding rather than reducing the choices people have, giving people

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<sup>75</sup> William Kaplan, “Is it time to close Hotel Canada?” Maclean’s Vol. 119, No. 51(25 December 2006): 20

the liberty to question past traditions when they (especially youth<sup>76</sup> and young adults) recognize reasons for change.

The above also suggest that Canada engage its federal, provincial, and territorial immigration departments as well as those institutions and organizations working on immigration issues on the ground. This is because the future of Canada lies in recognizing, supporting, and helping to advance the many different ways in which citizens with distinct politics, linguistic heritage, and social priorities (along with different ethnicities and religions) can interact with each other in different capacities, including as citizens. In this vein, government and civil society have a very important role to play in the lives of all citizens.<sup>77</sup>

Interestingly, in the *complexity* of the pluralism of identity is also the opportunity to inform the direction and emphasis of a foreign policy which could help to define 21<sup>st</sup> Century Canada; that is, an opportunity to explore that in spite of our plurality of identity, there exists also the opportunity to find commonality between people in Canada and among Canadians and those who live elsewhere. Inherent in the responses of interviewees were echoes of universalism and the “hospitality to difference,” factors Canada could very well be positioned to exercise leadership on into the future. Canada becomes a shared membership of the human race which, by definition, is local and global.<sup>78</sup> This, in turn, is a compelling argument to support human rights, supporting international norms and standards for the protection of minorities, and expanding the freedoms and choices of people in countries elsewhere to live lives they may have reason to value. One could see multiculturalism, diversity, and the pluralism of identity also pushing Canada into the realm of emphasizing the importance of other variables such as land and geography and peoples relation to it. As Yasmeen Abu-Laban and Christina Gabriel point out:

“...forms of globalization...- including the movement of people, the movement of ideas, the movement of images, and the movement of information - allow Canadians to engage in the wider world in ways that may be very different from that of the not-so-distant-past. As a result, the possibility of being linked to peoples and struggles in other parts of the world can add a new dimension to the sense of citizenship rights, belonging, identity, and social justice than has previously been marshalled in the name of equality. Such possibilities give new life-force to the potential of respect for a wide range of diversity (ethnic, cultural, gender, and so on) in an era of globalization, and illuminate the fact that “selling diversity” is but one approach to chart in the 21<sup>st</sup> century”<sup>79</sup>

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<sup>76</sup> Nadira A. Hira’s account of the need for businesses to adapt to a younger, more questioning generation is particular interesting in this regard. Please see: “You Raised Them, Now Manage Them” *Fortune* (May 28, 2007): 38-44

<sup>77</sup> From: Amartya Sen, *Identity and Violence: The Illusion of Destiny* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2006).

<sup>78</sup> Please see: Pico Iyer, “Canada: Global Citizen” *Canadian Geographic* (November-December 2004): 62-68; Alidad Mafinezam, “The World in Canada” *Literary Review of Canada* (July-August 2005): 3-5

<sup>79</sup> Yasmeen Abu-Laban and Christina Gabriel, *Selling Diversity: Immigration, Multiculturalism, Employment Equity, and Globalization* (Peterborough: Broadview Press, Ltd, 2002): Chapter 6.

The issue here is not whether or not we do these things or not; in many cases, we do. More importantly, if Canada is to be a global “Model Citizen”<sup>80</sup> and exercise leadership effectively, the question is: *Can we do better?*

Ultimately, the above also speak to what Canada is going to be and what it wants to be. While pluralism to a certain degree is inherent in any liberal democratic constitutional order, recognizing peoples’ pluralism of identity sensitizes us to the constraints limiting choice, to ensuring that information is readily available and accessible for people to use *rabi aql* (“the path of reasoning”)<sup>81</sup> and choice to make their minds up themselves; that is, strengthening democracy in Canada and public and equal participation in those choices. Canada has found that in the historic struggles between anglophones and francophones, there needed to be space created for Aboriginal peoples and immigrants that inhabit this country to “claim a space” for their own sense of belonging to Canada. This has led to a widening of what “Canadian” has become and will continue to do so given immigration, mixed-race marriages,<sup>82</sup> the hybridization of behaviour and culture that has been and will be inherent to the success of Canada’s future.

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<sup>80</sup> “Where Do I Belong? Exploring Citizenship in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century” Hart House Lecture, University of Toronto. Jennifer Welsh [http://individual.utoronto.ca/dtsang/hhlecture/Resources/Welsh\\_2004.pdf](http://individual.utoronto.ca/dtsang/hhlecture/Resources/Welsh_2004.pdf). [Internet accessed on April 26, 2007].

<sup>81</sup> Sen, *supra* note 73 at 162.

<sup>82</sup> “Mixed-Race Identity” Canadian Broadcasting Corporation [http://www.cbc.ca/news/background/mixed\\_blessings/](http://www.cbc.ca/news/background/mixed_blessings/). [Internet accessed September 12, 2007]

## V. Moving Forward

In 1990, Baltej Singh Dhillon won the right to wear his turban in the Royal Canadian Mounted Police. This marked a major milestone of change in the distinctive face of one of Canada's most historic institutions and, arguably, icons of Canadian identity. In the cacophony of debates at that time, one centered on Mr. Herman Bittner particularly garnered media attention. Bittner sold more than 13,000 copies of a calendar which was created to oppose the lifting of the federal ban on the wearing of turbans in the RCMP.<sup>83</sup> In fact, Bittner himself appeared in the calendar under the banner of a particularly intriguing question, "Is this Canadian or does this make you a Sikh?"<sup>84</sup>

The case of Baltej Singh Dhillon is now well known in Canada and elsewhere. Nonetheless, its symbolism, let alone the symbolism of a turbaned RCMP officer, provides us with a window into the debates we have faced and are facing in Canada today around multiculturalism, diversity, and pluralism generally, and perhaps those we will continue to face into tomorrow. The question Bittner himself articulated, struck right at where the centre of gravity of such debates usually lies: the choice between identities, or at least the presumed mutual exclusivity of identities we may possess (*i.e.* Canadian *or* Sikh).

This Report has endeavoured to share some of the knowledge and findings of my Global Youth Fellowship 2006, whose focus was a *preliminary examination* into the nature and relationship of multiculturalism/diversity for Canadian foreign policy. Furthermore, my Fellowship also examined whether another model for defining some aspects of Canadian foreign policy is needed, one that gives more attention to the pluralism of identity (*i.e.* multiple identities and affiliations) as opposed to multiculturalism/diversity alone. Through interviews with leaders in Canada, the United Kingdom, and South Africa, who have brought their own experiences to bear, I have attempted to share some general thoughts on multiculturalism, diversity, and the pluralism of identity for foreign policy. I have also attempted to advance some interrelated ideas for Canadian foreign policy: that Canada must continue to "cultivate its garden" more seriously; open doors, enhance knowledge, and develop appropriate institutional responses along the dimensions of multiculturalism and diversity; and, finally, embrace what a pluralism of identity can offer for domestic and foreign policy.

Building on the analysis on section (IV), the following points below provides some general recommendations for moving forward:

*Knowledge Development and Deeper Institutionalization* of multiculturalism, diversity, and pluralism of identity in government departments and civil society organizations involved in foreign policy issues. For example, moving beyond the Muslim Communities Working Group at the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade to encompass broader and representative issues around multiculturalism, diversity, and the pluralism of identity. This includes: fostering the role of Diasporas, transnational networks, and dual citizens;

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<sup>83</sup> Thane Burnet, "RCMP Turban, 15 Years After" *The Toronto Sun* (6 March, 2006). Also available at: "RCMP Turban, 15 Years After" *The Toronto Sun* [http://torontosun.canoe.ca/News/Columnists/Burnett\\_Thane/2006/03/05/1473155.html](http://torontosun.canoe.ca/News/Columnists/Burnett_Thane/2006/03/05/1473155.html). [Internet accessed August 30, 2007].

<sup>84</sup> *Ibid.*

deepening research on multiculturalism, diversity and pluralism of identity; outreach, and opening of doors for people of all backgrounds to get involved in foreign policy beyond the “usual suspects” (such as established NGOs and Diaspora groups); collaborating with government departments and civil society institutions working on immigration issues (*e.g.* setting up a policy roundtable with civil society institutions, the Department of Citizenship and Immigration Canada, and provincial and territorial immigration departments on the links between immigration and foreign policy); exploring the possibility of using foreign policy initiatives as a tool for immigrant integration; finally, as noted below, hiring of more diverse peoples. There is a real opportunity here to build bridges and foster synergies with the new Aga Khan “Global Centre for Pluralism”<sup>85</sup> on what multiculturalism, diversity, and pluralism of identity offer for foreign policy beyond what Canada has attempted to do so far.

*Engagement (Civic and Global):* Investing in the power of individuals and communities to make connections with each other in Canada and the world outside of Canada with the objectives of dialogue to finding the commonalities that bind. For example, building on existing models such as Canada World Youth and Katimivik but widening and deepening them; developing similar programs for encouraging and fostering exchange of pluralisms for adults. These programs should be well supported with high public and international recognition (*e.g.* the Prime Minister’s/Governor-General’s “Young Citizens Program” or adult “Ambassadors” program).

*Education:* Investments to continue to nurture educated youth and adults who are nationally and globally informed and conscious. This means among other things: representativeness of scholarly information (historical and international) in educational materials; seed money and financial support for establishing and/or supporting think-tanks and organizations dedicated to enhancing and sharing knowledge and information on foreign policy.

*Recruitment and Retention of Aboriginal peoples, Immigrants and Visible Minorities in Public Institutions:* This includes (amongst other things) carrying out a Deputy-Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Trade led initiative corralling the country-specific linguistic and “cultural” skills and knowledge that Aboriginal, immigrant, and visible minority public servants may have and matching them to foreign policy and programming initiatives.

*Enhancement of Investments in Aboriginal Political, Economic, and Social Development Programs as well as Enhancement of Investments in Immigrant “Integration” Programs:* This includes initiatives combating racism, sexism, homophobia, and so forth.

*Development and Dissemination of General Guidelines on the Role and Participation of the Federal, Provincial, and Territorial Governments in Foreign Policy* in order to make clear to Canadians what to expect from these levels of government in matters of foreign policy.

As the above initiatives illustrate, there is much work to be done and effort to be expended if Canada is to be a successful multicultural, diverse and plural country at home and in its expression, actions, and roles abroad. In spite of Canada’s “distinctiveness,” there exist in Canada many historical and institutional failings; our “success” and rhetoric as a

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<sup>85</sup> Please see: <http://www.pluralism.ca>

multicultural, diverse, and plural country conceal the real, deep-seated challenges the country faces.

Yet, our failings also present Canada with new and real opportunities, particularly as Canada becomes more multicultural, diverse, and plural in a globalizing, post-September 11, 2007 environment. As Canada endeavours to adapt to a world that is at home and abroad,<sup>86</sup> a world that is dominated by national security agendas, new nodes of international power, and where the ability of people to live together under “one” national and global roof is increasingly coming under reappraisal, Canada provides hope, a hope I continue to hold onto since my arrival to its cold shores in 1988. Giving people the reasons to value being a Canadian amongst, and together with, the many identity variables we may have reason to value is the challenge that Canadian foreign policy must increasingly take on for itself.

In conclusion, in the hope and journey of “finding our way,”<sup>87</sup> I am inclined to agree with Amartya Sen when he notes:

“In resisting the minituarization of human beings...we can also open up the possibility of a world that can overcome the memory of its troubled past and subdue the insecurities of its difficult present. We have to make sure, above all, that our mind is not halved by a horizon”<sup>88</sup>

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<sup>86</sup> Jennifer Welsh, *At Home in the World: Canada's Global Vision for the Twenty-First Century* (Toronto: Harper Collins, 2004)

<sup>87</sup> Will Kymlicka, *Finding Our Way: Rethinking Ethnocultural Relations in Canada* (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1998)

<sup>88</sup> Amartya Sen, *Identity and Violence: The Illusion of Destiny* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2006): 185-186.

## **Annex: List of Interviewees**

### **Canada**

*Mr. V. Peter Harder*, former Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada, Ottawa-Gatineau

*Dr. Will Kymlicka*, Canada Research Chair in Philosophy, Queen's University, Kingston

*Mr. Mel Cappe*, President, Institute for Research on Public Policy (IRPP), Montréal

*Ms. Ratna Omidvar*, Executive Director, The Maytree Foundation, Toronto

*Dr. Ayman Al-Yassini*, Executive Director, Canadian Race Relations Foundation, Toronto

*The Honourable Jason Kenney*, P.C., M.P. Secretary of State (Multiculturalism and Canadian Identity), Ottawa-Gatineau/Calgary

*Ms. Mary Simon*, President, Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami, Ottawa-Gatineau

*Dr. Sheema Khan*, Columnist, The Globe & Mail, Ottawa-Gatineau/Toronto

*Dr. Howard Duncan*, Executive Head, Metropolis Project, Department of Citizenship and Immigration Canada, Ottawa-Gatineau

*Monsieur Bernard Landry*, 28<sup>e</sup> premier-ministre du Québec et Professeur, département stratégie des affaires, École des sciences de la gestion, Université du Québec à Montréal, Montréal

### **United Kingdom**

*Ms. Rachel Briggs*, Head of Identity Programme, DEMOS, London

*Dr. Rachel Pillai*, Research Fellow, Migration, Equalities, and Citizenship Team, Institute for Public Policy Research (IPPR), London

*Ms. Katy Reade*, Senior Analyst, the UK Commission for Racial Equality, London

*Sir Bernard Crick*, Emeritus Professor, University of Edinburgh, Edinburgh

*Dr. Christopher Hill*, Director, Centre for International Relations, University of Cambridge, Cambridge

*Mr. David Goodhart*, Editor, Prospect Magazine, London

*Dr. Steve Vertovec*, Director, Centre for Migration, Policy, and Society, Oxford University, Oxford

*Lord Bhikhu Parekh*, UK House of Lords, London

## **South Africa**

*Mr. Oupa Makbalemele* (Researcher) and *Ms. Sinothile Msomi* (Project Manager, Peacebuilding Programme), Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation (CSV), Braamfontein/Johannesburg

*Dr. Sally Peberdy*, Project Manager, South African Migration Project (SAMP), University of the Witwatersand, Johannesburg

*Mr. Paul Graham*, Executive Director, Institute for Democracy in South Africa (IDASA), Pretoria

*Mr. Sandile Memela*, Spokesperson for the Minister, Department of Arts and Culture South Africa, Pretoria

*Mr. John Matsbikizwa*, Columnist (The Mail & Guardian), Actor, Playwright, Freelancer, and Chevalier de l'ordre des palmes académiques (France), Melville/Johannesburg

*Mr. Kumi Naidoo*, Secretary-General, CIVICUS (World Alliance for Citizen Participation), Newtown/Johannesburg

*Dr. Gerhard Maré*, Director, Centre for Critical Research on Race and Diversity, and Professor, Department of Sociology, University of KwaZulu-Natal, Durban

*Mr. David Steward*, Executive Director, F. W. De Klerk Foundation, Platteklouf/Cape Town

*Dr. Melissa Steyn*, Director, Intercultural and Diversity Studies of Southern Africa (INCUDISA) and Associate Professor, Humanities Faculty, University of Cape Town, Cape Town

*Dr. Simon Bekker*, Professor, Department of Sociology, Stellenbosch University, Stellenbosch